Ethnicity, mobilization and territory: an overview of recent experiences

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Abstract: This paper does not provide detailed discussions of specific cases of linkages between ethnic groups, political mobilization and territory, but it is concerned with debates on explanatory general models of these phenomena. The paper attempts to capture some features common to a variety of situations and cases in the postcommunist part of Eurasia as well as in the Atlantic area. First, it is concerned with the question of what general model connecting modernization process with ethnonational political mobilization seems successful in explaining the salience of ethnicity in political, economic and cultural affairs in the Eurasian and Atlantic regions. Second, it deals with general modalities of territorial autonomy and self-government accommodating the variety of ethnonational aspirations and demands. Finally, the paper draws some general lessons and indicates some hypotheses relating to these phenomena and issues.

Key words: ethnicity, political mobilization, territory, general models.

1. Introduction

"Ethnic conflict is frequently about territory" (p.48).

"There is no magic formula for calming ethnic conflict and replacing it with sweetness and light" (p. 102).

"No electoral units are dictated; they are chosen by us, and the answer depends on how they are chosen. Is historical continuity or geographic coherence to be ignored? There is also the principle that even a cultural/national group which is not in a majority anywhere may nevertheless, or all the more, require to have a safe haven, shelter, base, somewhere. There is also the fact that the involvement of a culture with a territory differs according to whether the population in question produced microchips, grew potatoes, herded camels or hunted reindeer" (p. 105).

Ernst Gellner (1997) Nationalism. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson

I have chosen these quotations from the small book written by Ernst Gellner in order to highlight a number of phenomena and issues that seem to be in the focus of current theoretical and empirical debates on ethnicity, political mobilization and territory. First of all, one of the reasons why the geographical community dares to say something substantial about the phenomenon of ethnicity and associated issues is exactly due to the

fact that both in definitions of ethnic groups and in ethnonational claims on autonomy and self-government, the notion of territory or homeland plays a very crucial role. The second quotation from Gellner's small book underlines our historical and current experiences indicating that, indeed, there are no magic solutions of interethnic tensions. All proposed or realized solutions have been based on some power sharing strategies as in Switzerland (whether consociational or integrative), or on some assimilationist strategies as in Franco's Spain, or on secessionist or irredentist strategies as in the last years of the former Soviet Union, or in war-driven contexts on transfers of ethnic groups, in other words on ethnic cleansing, as in major parts of former Yugoslavia. All these various strategies have been followed in the past and it is matter of fact that they all are being considered as realistic solutions of interethnic conflicts in our times of globalized economic, political and also cultural affairs.

Finally, the third quotation from Gellner's book emphasizes again the simple, yet important fact that territories proposed for realizations of ethnonational aspirations to autonomy and self-government are all man-made. This also applies to geographical delineations of homelands of ethnic groups. Moreover, the third quotation also points to the importance of territories in the sense of providing room for cultural and political affairs and room and resources for economic activities of ethnic groups. From this specific geographic vantage point, ethnic territories and territorial claims are extremely important elements in processes of ethnonational political mobilization. From a primordialist perspective, historical homelands of ethnic group are viewed as durable markers of experience, of memory, and thus of identity. From an instrumentalist perspective, ethnic territories are constructs that can be manipulated, an instrument for mobilizing ethnicity-based emotions and interests on behalf of ethnic elites in their competition for wealth, power and status.

As Ernst Gellner (1997), Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin (1983), David Knight (1982, 1994) and many other scholars made clear, ethnicity-based political mobilization is a phenomenon that is basically a fragmenting force at odds with a simple conception of a stable global order. A phenomenon unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future even when far-reaching territorial accommodative strategies would be followed in order to integrate ethnic nationalism within varying political limits. Accordingly, Smith (1995: 160) has argued that "over and beyond any political and economic benefits that ethnic nationalism can confer, it is (the) promise of collective but terrestrial immortality, outfacing death and oblivion, that has helped to sustain so many nations and national states in an era of unprecedented social change and to renew so many ethnic minorities that seemed to be doomed in an era of technological uniformity and corporate efficiency". And Giddens (1994, 81) has been willing to go even further and claim that "globalization leads also to an insistence on diversity, a search to recover lost local traditions, and an emphasis on local cultural identity – seen in a renewal of local nationalisms and ethnicities". It seems therefore little surprising that we have experienced autonomist and even disruptive separatist forces of the phenomena of ethnonationalism and ethnicity-based political mobilization in the states in West-Europe and North America forming the Atlantic area and in the eastern postcommunist part of Eurasia formed today by a few old states and many new or restored states.

There has been a research interface connecting aspects of ethnonational and ethnoregional political mobilization and issues of territorial autonomy (cf. Bennett, 1989). Since the rise of ethnoregional movements in many West-European states and Canadian Quebec in the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Rokkan and Urwin, 1983, Knight, 1982, Rudolph and Thompson, eds, 1989, Keating, 1991, Coakley, 1992), and in particular since the spectacular resurgence of fragmenting ethnonational aspirations in the post-communist space of Eurasia (cf. Zaslavsky, 1992, Dostál, 1989, 1991, 1993, Kaiser, 1994, Musil, 1995, Brubaker, 1996) there is obviously a need to reconsider this research interface also from the vantage point of the recent experiences of the 1990s. The state, and usually the nation-state, is still the dominating form of politico-territorial division and this will last in the near future. However, the (nation-)state is challenged by two divergent processes: (i) the move towards supranational unifying forms, to political territories such as the European Union and (ii) the rise of subnational ethnoregional groups that have desired to articulate and defend their interest derived from minority status within a larger society and (nation-)state.

A body of reported research has mainly addressed policies and processes of "nation-building" and "state-building" within the frame of existing states. However, the recent massive fragmentation of federal state formations and reorganization of political space along ethnonational lines in the eastern part of Eurasian continent confronts us, both the political geographers and the administrative geographers, with the need of a theoretically sophisticated and historically and thus empirically rich account of existing situations. In this paper I only can have a more modest aim and cannot obviously offer such an account. My remarks are necessarily on a general level taking as a point of departure not detailed discussions of specific cases but debates on explanatory general models. Accordingly, my sketch is deliberately drawn in broad and general terms. This is partly because it attempts to capture some features common to a variety of situations and cases in the postcommunist part of Eurasia as well as in the Atlantic area. First, I will elaborate on the question of what general model connecting modernization process with ethnonational political mobilization seems successful in explaining the salience of ethnicity in political, economic and cultural affairs in the Eurasian and Atlantic regions. Second, I will deal with general modalities of territorial autonomy and self-government accommodating the variety of ethnonational aspirations and demands. Finally, I draw some general lessons and indicate some hypotheses relating to these phenomena and issues.

2. Modernization and ethnonational political mobilization

Viewed from today's vantage point any concern with possible causal relations between modernization and ethnonational political mobilization is not a simple matter. There are three general explanatory models dealing with these causal relations (cf. Nielsen, 1985, Ragin, 1979).

2.1. Diffusion-erasure (assimilation) model

First, there is the diffusion-erasure (assimilation) model postulating that the importance of ethnic identity decreases with intensified diffusion of modernization across

ethnically heterogeneous population. Well-known claims of influential traditional modernization theories of both the western type (cf. Deutsch, 1966, Kellas, 1991) and the Marxist-Leninist type (cf. Bromley et al, 1977) were predicting the decreasing importance of ethnonational and ethno-territorial boundaries as effective vehicles for collective action in the political and economic affairs of industrialized economies and urbanized societies. Their common belief was that a whole gamut of market-driven (in the West) or centrally directed (in the East) social mobilization (i.e. modernization) processes largely associated with changing class cleavages (in the West) or class struggle (in the East) and other socio-economic or political distinctions and associated interests would finally erode the mobilizing importance of ethnonational distinctions and interests. While the claims of these modernization theories have had merit in some analyses of historical instances of nation-building and state-building (see for instance Heinemeyer, 1968) they are clearly not adequate to explain the spectacular role of ethnonational political mobilization within the former Soviet geopolitical orbit; recent empirical evidence from that vast area showed other and much more complicated patterns of the resurgence of ethnonationalism (Dostál, 1989, 1993, Zaslavsky, 1992).

2.2. Internal colonization model

Second, there is the internal colonization model developed by Hechter (1975) in his analysis of the Celtic Fringe in British national development and integration. He focuses on ethnic solidarity and its persistence in modern societies within a framework of reactive-ethnicity. According to this model, ethnic solidarity is basically a rational reaction of the ethnically distinct periphery against economic exploitation by the centre occupied by another and dominant ethnic group. The rational nature of reactive ethnic solidarity rests largely in the economic interests of ethnic groups. Ethnonational political mobilization occurs when an interethnic (so-called cultural) division of labour (Hechter and Levi, 1979) has developed implying a structural discrimination of the peripheral ethnic group. This internal colonialism model postulates that with such a division of labour in which members of a dominant ethnic group occupy higher positions and command important political and economic resources and members of other ethnic group(s) occupy inferior positions, ethnic distinctions and boundaries tend to overlap the major structural cleavages of modern society, and ethnic solidarity becomes a sufficient basis for effective political mobilization against the centre. In brief, the greater the overlapping and relative economic disadvantages of the peripheral ethnic group, the greater the likelihood that anti-centre ethnonational aspirations and demands for rectification or elimination of the exploitative linkages with the centre will arise. According to this model ethnonational political mobilization tends to proceed unevenly (cf. also Kaiser, 1994: 190ff). The internal colonization model is an attractive and simple way of explaining the resurgence of ethnonational political mobilization in some modern societies (cf. Ragin, 1979). But the phenomenon of spectacular ethnonationalism that gradually arose within the Soviet geopolitical orbit since the advent of communist reforms in the late 1980s and later since the postcommunist reforms cannot be explained in these simple terms of internal colonization (cf. Dostál, 1993).

2.3. Interethnic competition model

Finally, there is the model explaining causal relations between modernization and ethnonational political mobilization in terms of interethnic competition. It is important to note that the fracturing ethnonational political mobilization based on a subjective sense of relative deprivation was a crucial catalyst for increasing ethnonational assertiveness in economically developed regions of the former Soviet Union (Brzezinski, 1989, Dostál, 1989). The same seems to apply to early autonomy and sovereignty seeking ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia (Dostál, 1991), former Czechoslovakia (cf. Musil, 1995, Dostál, 1998) and interestingly also in post-Franco Spain (Sole-Vilanova, 1989, Clark, 1989). In all these cases the diffusion of early ethnonational aspirations to more self-government and sovereignty tended to start in modern developed regions of the state formation to which they belonged. From there the waves of ethnonational resurgence diffused towards less-developed peripheries of the multi-ethnic state formations concerned. The sense of relative deprivation was not limited to economic affairs, but it involved cultural and political affairs as well. In other words, significant interregional economic equalization did not solve the problem of fracturing ethnonational aspiration of the ethnic groups concerned. Hechter and his research associate Furtado recognized the explanatory weakness of the internal colonization model. In an analysis of ethnonational political mobilization in Estonia and the Ukraine, they emphasized the importance of an inter-ethnic political competition perspective viewing ethnonational groups as communities of solidarity with forward-looking political, economic and cultural interests (Furtado and Hechter, 1995). Communist and postcommunist reforms have "enabled nationalist movements to win political support on the basis of collective goods appeals. It has given nationalists influence over state policy. In permitting the election of their representatives to state offices, perestroyka has supplied nationalist movements with their most valuable private goods" (1995: 196–197). As Furtado and Hechter underlined, ethnonational movements "can be seen as groups that are created to provide joint goods for the exclusive consumption of a culturally defined constituency." Because "geographical proximity and common culture facilitate both interest articulation and the adoption of the constitutional procedures necessary for collective decision making. The ultimate good that these movements would appear to promise is territorial sovereignty, which increases the likelihood of the enactment of policies providing a wide variety of collective goods. Thus, given control of the state apparatus, nationalists could enact language and citizenship laws that enhance their economic opportunities and political rights at the expense of nonnationals. Promises of collective goods available only to members of the cultural community are a principal basis of political support for nationalist movements" (1995: 173, cf. also Brubaker, 1992).

Thus, unlike the reactive ethnicity perspective, the model of interethnic competition emphasizes heightened ethnonational identity in modern society as an effective vehicle of political mobilization. Because, ethnicity is to be "considered not as the independent variable but as an intermediate variable. Groups must first forge a common identity before mobilizing, but that identity, reinforced by the mobilization itself, serves to sustain the capacity for common action" (Keating, 1991: 119). According to Nielsen "the

competitive model of ethnic resurgence is based on the same premise as the functionalist one: as a culturally heterogenous population becomes industrialized, the spread of a market economy, increased bureaucratization and other aspects of modernity entail the precedence of universalistic criteria that cut across the traditional system of ascribed statuses. As modernization affects distinct ethnic groups more homogeneously, assignments of individuals to occupations and the distribution of societal rewards in general tend to be made increasingly on the basis of rational and achieved criteria that crosscut ethnic boundaries". However, it is important to emphasize that according to this diffusion-competition perspective, ethnicity becomes even more relevant due to increasing modernization because "the crucial element of such a situation is that members of different ethnic groups find themselves increasingly in a position to compete for the same occupations and the same rewards (1985: 133–134). According to the internal colonization model ethnonational resurgence is more likely when there is an interethnic division of labour in which the dominant ethnic groups colonize and exploit subordinated ethnic groups. In contrast, in the competition model, the major postulate claims that ethnic resurgences will occur precisely because the interethnic division breaks down, interethnic discrepancies in modernization diminish and members of different groups are more likely to be involved in competition for the same economic resources and political competencies. Analysing the Welsh case in Great Britain, Ragin has drawn the conclusion that the ethnic competition perspective explains the ethnic political mobilization in this Atlantic region, because "ethnic mobilization can be seen as an attempt to gain a competitive edge in the struggle for roles and resources" (1979: 633).

As I already indicated above, the interethnic competition model seems to give us an effective explanatory base when we are concerned with cases of ethnonational mobilization in circumstances of a democratic or significantly democratizing political regime. In other words, when political mobilization can effectively be based on ethnic political elites and parties that can take part in more or less free elections and follow the course of ethnonational mobilization. Having indicated the reasons why ethnicity-based political mobilization can be seen as intensified by modernization processes and lead to interethnic competition I now attempt to construct a simple cross-classification of two dimensions and consider cases of political mobilization of major ethnic groups from post-Franco Spain and the three former communist federations, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. First, following Frey (1992), I classify the major ethnic groups concerned into two categories: early seekers (leaders) of self-government and sovereignty and late seekers (laggards). In each of the democratizing states concerned certain major ethnic groups have pressed for more autonomy or sovereignty before other major ethnic groups. Obviously, these leaders in ethnonational mobilization did not make identical demands across countries. But, in comparison to other major ethnic groups within the same country, they raised their demands first. Next, I classify the cases concerned into a category of ethnic groups living in homelands that can be seen as advanced and modern regional economies and ones living in territories that must be labelled as less-developed and less-modern regions.

Table 1 Modernization and early ethnonational political mobilization

Ethnonational Aspirations to Self-Government and Sovereignty	Level of Modernization	
	Low	High
Early		Basque Country, Catalonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia
Late	Castille, Galicia, Andalucia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herz, Macedonia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan	Czech Lands, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine

The general cross-classification shown in Table 1 clearly indicates that in the four democratizing multi-ethnic states concerned, ethnic groups with advanced regional economies tended to assert the first and often most far-reaching demands for self-government and sovereignty. It appears that from these highly mobilized ethnic regions the political mobilization drive tended to diffuse towards other less-advanced ethnic regions. This result indicates that a high level of economic development and modernization seems to provide a strong factor supporting the desire of ethnic groups to compete for more self-government and sovereignty (cf. also Frye, 1992: 602ff). It seems that the leading ethnic groups in the process of ethnopolitical mobilization tended to exercise a demonstration effect on other. This seems to be the case in post-Franco Spain (cf. Sole-Vilanova, 1989, Linz and Stepan, 1996: 98ff), but also in the case of the former Soviet Union (Zaslavsky, 1992, Dostál, 1993) and in the Czechoslovak dual federation where the Slovaks reached parity in economic development with the Czechs in the 1980s (cf. Musil, 1993, Dostál, 1998). However, there is also a small group of outliers in Table 1 that seem to contradict this general tendency. Some explanation of this deviant group can be derived from the fact that both the Czechs and the Russians had a clear numerical dominance in the former federal formations and were seen by the other ethnic groups as de facto titular ethnic groups of the multi-ethnic states concerned. Further, the Belorussians and Ukrainians were the most assimilated (at least linguistically russified) populations among the major ethnic groups in the former Soviet Union (cf. Dostál, 1993) and this seemingly weakened early ethnonational mobilization in these two cases. Finally, it must be noted again that only the major ethnic groups are dealt with in this general cross-classification and the diversity of ethnic political mobilization processes of other small groups is left in limbo.

3. Modalities of territorial strategies

There is an impressive variety of existing territorial strategies that can be used in accommodating ethnonational aspirations (Duchacek, 1986, Keating, 1991, Coakley, 1993). When ethnic groups are numerically weak some common techniques of

democratic rule may be so chosen as to maximize its representation in the organs of government or give them control, or at least significant influence over, specific levels or branches of government. Federalism is one of forms of government used to give territorially concentrated ethnic groups more autonomy. In contrast, proportional representation may be favoured by ethnic groups when they a geographically dispersed. When ethnic groups are geographically concentrated the modalities of decentralization or deconcentration can give them possibilities of administering their own regionally or locally established rules (constitutional federalism) or of administering regionally/locally the rules originating from the central government (administrative federalism). These modalities already indicate that the central state has a number of options in its responses to persistent and powerful demands of ethnic groups. Many of the central state's responses are non-territorial, but they may be classified in terms of the extent to which they are based on decentralization and deconcentration of competences and means to substate territorial units.

First, there is regionalism with modalities based on various degrees of regional autonomy. The modalities are all following the principle of devolution of competences and means from the centre to ethnic regions. However, the defining aspect of regionalism is that the central government can limit the devolution and withdraw decentralized competences and means. Thus, the central authority has the political capacity to centralize or decentralize more or less power to territorial sub-units. Any delegation of powers is revocable and amendable in its scope (Duchacek, 1986, Coakley, 1993).

Second, there is federalism and is essentially differing from regionalism because in a genuine federal state, the key constitutional principle is the irrevocability of the power division between the centre and constituent parts (Dostál, 1993: 107–108). A permanent division of competencies and political powers between a central authority and constituting territorial components is freely agreed among the authorities of respective territorial domains. The powers of the distinct levels are neither derived from nor dependent on each other and elimination of territorial autonomy is ruled out. Federalism seems to be appropriate for territorial communities which desire self-government, but wish to achieve a number of additional aims by combining their resources and domains in a large composite entity which is distinct from and interacts with other states. The additional aims are usually economic advantages to be derived from a common large market, common protection against external economic or military pressures. An awareness of cultural affinity and common destiny can also contribute to federal assertion of constituent units vis-a-vis other states. It is important to note that the irrevocability of power division freely agreed between the centre and constituent territorial units must prevent the emergence of a "war of laws" between the federal centre and the legislation of self-governmental territories of ethnic groups.

Third, there are modalities of confederation. In contrast to federal arrangements, a confederal system is not committed to institute a supra-sovereign entity of an overarching state. The sovereign states associated in a confederal arrangement do not accept subordination to a numerical majority of other participants, except in a few marginal matters. The confederal parties combine some of their efforts into a co-operative association, yet they retain veto rights in collective decision-making on all important issues (Dostál, 1989). The cooperation is for the purpose of executing several specific common

tasks such as economic matters or defence. Common confederal institutions are therefore bodies which are not entitled by the associated states to enact rules or make decisions which directly affect citizens of the participating states (Duchacek, 1986). A confederal citizenship is absent, yet free movement of persons or organizations across boundaries is generally accepted. Accordingly, legislation of associated states cannot be overshadowed by confederal measures and political and the economic sovereign powers of composite state are maintained. In short, confederal arrangements based on democratic association usually declare the assertion of sovereign self-rule against interferences in domestic affairs by common confederal institutions as well as guaranteeing the territorial sovereignty of participating states allowing them secession or disassociation from the confederal compact. Thus, modalities of confederalism are in practice an intermediate fase between federal solutions and decomposition into fully sovereign states.

Fourth, I have to emphasize with Duchacek (1986) and Coakley (1993) the importance of asymmetric structures in all these modalities. In the modalities of regionalism, federalism and confederalism there are examples of asymmetrical solutions of issues of territorial autonomy and self-government of ethnic groups. In asymmetrical structures the central authority does not relate to all its component regions in essentially the same way. Modalities of asymmetric relations of the centre with ethnic regions have been used as accommodative strategies often in the three former communist multiethnic and federal formations of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, but also in Canada, Great Britain, Italy and Spain.

Finally, there are modalities of centralism largely ignoring territory when the central state is conceding ethnic groups certain collective rights of basically non-territorial kind. Politico-administrative power remains centralized, but a power sharing and compromise arrangments are institutionalized. There are two approaches to power sharing: (i) the consociational approach and (ii) the integrative approach (Sisk, 1996, 34ff). Consociationalists (cf. Lijphard, 1977) suggest greater emphasis on assurances for minority ethnic group protection and reliance on elite cooperation as a major mode of successful institutional accommodation in multi-ethnic societies. They emphasize: (a) broad-based parliamentary coalitions, (b) mutual veto rights against majorization, (c) proportionality in electoral systems and allocation of resources, and (d) segmented groups autonomy. In contrast, integrationalists (cf. Horowitz, 1985, 597ff) advocate a package deal that must create an incentive structure for interethnic power sharing: (a) dispersion of (territorialized) power, (b) devolution of power in an effort to foster intra-ethnic competition at the regional/local levels, (c) promotion of preelection electoral coalitions by vote pooling, (d) encouragement of alternative social alignments (social group or region) and cross-cutting non-ethnic cleavages and (e) distribution of resources between ethnic groups and reducing disparities. It is important to note that these power sharing strategies need to be introduced only in some regions of multi-ethnic states. An interesting example of the consociational approch provides the case of South Tyrol in Italy (cf. Markusse, 1997).

This short overview of basic modalities in ethno-territorial autonomy and self-government provides by necessity a highly simplified picture of the impressive variety of existing territorial strategies that can be used in accommodating ethnonational aspirations and inter-ethnic conflicts. However, recent experiences in the Atlantic region, but

especially in the post-communist part of Eurasia, have shown us that the capacity of territorial restructuring to solve interethnic conflicts and accommodate ethnonational demands should not be overestimated. In any case, there is the challenge of drawing a number of general lessons in order to formulate hypotheses directing our research on ethnonational mobilization and territorial autonomy and self-government.

4. General lessons and some hypothesis

The preceding reflections on the explanatory models of ethnonational mobilization and the modalities of territorial strategies make it possible to draw a number of general lessons and formulate some associated hypotheses.

First, the major finding of the overview of basic modalities of territorial strategies is that there is a quite wide range of territorial and institutional arrangements. The lesson to be drawn is that the accommodative capacity of territorial solutions must closely be linked to kinds of institutional arrangements and rules that are being used inside and outside territories concerned. One problem is that new territorial units of self-government are typically multi-ethnic and that interethnic tensions have been moved to another tier of the territorial division. For ethnic groups, conflicting claims on territory are often a zero sum situation, in particular when territory is associated with a strong symbolic aspects of ethnic groups' identities (cf. Sisk, (1996, 14ff). Conflicts with a strong territorial dimension tend to lead to problems of irredentism, secession or forced transfers. The central question is which sorts of institutions and rules can create incentive structures and stimulate ethnic groups to mediate their differences and accept accommodative deals by the legitimate institutions of a shared democratic state. Consociationalists such as Lijphard (1977) suggest greater emphasis on assurances for minority ethnic group protection and reliance on elite cooperation as a mayor mode of successful institutional accommodation in multi-ethnic societies. A challenging hypothesis is that the consociational arrangements are entrenching ethnicity in the political systems and freezing interethnic boundaries and cleavages. Integrationalists (Horowitz, 1985, 597ff, 1993) advocate to create an incentive structure for interethnic power sharing focussed on dispersion of (territorialized) power, on intra-ethnic competition at the regional/local levels encouraging cross-cutting non-ethnic cleavages. Looking at postwar Atlantic experiences, it seems safe to recognize the importance of ethnic political elites in any power sharing strategies. However, analyses of such cases as Switzerland (cf. Duchacek, 1986) and Italian South Tyrol (cf. Markusse, 1997) indicate that the consociational approach seems to provide more effective principles of accommodation because it fits better into democratic conditions of the multi-ethnic states of the Atlantic region. In this approach, multi-ethnic coalitions are formed after an election by ethnic elites. In an integrative power sharing, coalitions are formed before an election (cf. vote pooling) (cf. Horowitz, 1985, Sisk, 1996, 40ff). It seems that the integrationalist approach is more compatible with nation-building strategies of new states.

Second, the role of elite mobilization and the relevance of the interethnic competition model has to be emphasized. With Gellner (1983, 1997) one can draw the general lesson that in the modern world, every society brings out cultural elite that for emotional reasons and self-interest defends primordial values and practices (cf. also Smith, 1995, Linz and

Stepan, 1996, 24ff). One has to recognize that objective factors and tendencies such as institutional arrangements and economic and regional development appear to be inter-locked with basically subjective factors of ethnic political mobilization and regional interests formation. From this follows that ethnonational political mobilization did not occur due to the less developed status of an ethnic group, but because modernization created a more outward looking, socially mobilized populace. According to this diffusion-competition perspective, ethnicity becomes even more relevant when interethnic discrepancies diminish and members of different groups are more likely to be involved in competition for the same economic resources and political competencies (cf. Nielsen, 1985). With Hannan (1979) and Ragin (1979) I would like to emphasize the hypothesis that modernization increases the likelihood of large-scale ethnopolitical mobilization because this follows from the mechanism of interethnic competition in which the relative numerical strength of the largest competitor with the centre will be more successful when organized around large-scale identities. This is more likely when new competitive opportunities are introduced, as in circumstances of democratic transition and when economic diversification and selection between rich and poor regions leads to aggregate uncertainty of respective core and peripheral ethnic groups with regard to redistributive consequences of far-reaching (revolutionary regime changing) institutional and economic transformations (Dostál, 1989: 39-41, 1998: 28–29).

Third, a general lesson to be drawn is that the role of institutional explanations is crucial. We may note that institutional explanations seek to expand further the major claim of the interethnic competition model. The de jure federalization of a modern state provided for an autonomous status of territorial communities. In the specific case of the communist federal formations, territorial autonomy was explicitly based on the notion of historical homelands of some major ethnic groups. Three hypotheses have to be emphasized (cf. also Dostál, 1991, 122–127, 1998, Wolchik, 1995, 163–164). Firstly, ethno-territorial federalization encouraged the formation of a clearer sense of officially recognized historical homelands, giving to the titular ethnic groups a growing sense of territorial exclusiveness. Ethnicity became institutionalized. Thus, ethnonational aspirations and demands were easily based on territorial ethnocentrism. Secondly, winning the republican elections in the period of democratization enabled the ethnonational movements or parties to gain control over the existing administrative apparatus and territory and establish their legislative powers and sovereignty. Thirdly, the analyses suggest that the rising ethnonational aspirations and the associated secessionist demands were not a cause, but a consequence of the lack of legitimacy of the federal system, i.e. a system that was seen by most of the ethnic groups as a part of the obsolete institutional legacy of etatist-socialism.

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ETNICITA, MOBILIZACE A TERITORIUM: PŘEHLED NOVÝCH ZKUŠENOSTÍ

Résumé

Příspěvek se zabývá vztahy mezi etnickými skupinami, politickou mobilizací a teritoriem a hledá obecné rysy těchto jevů v rozmanitosti situací v postkomunistické Evropě a v Atlantické oblasti. Nejprve se věnuje otázce, který obecný model spojující modernizační proces s etnonárodní politickou mobilizací může být úspěšný při vysvětlení důležitosti etnického faktoru v současných politických, ekonomických a kulturních problémech ve velkém počtu regionů ve zmíněných částech světa. Konfrontace difusního-asimilačního modelu s modelem vnitřní kolonizace a modelem konkurence politických elit ukazuje, že poslední z hodnocených modelů uspokojivě vysvětluje závažnost etnického faktoru v současných procesech politické mobilizace. Politická mobilizace na etnickém základě se ukazuje zvláště důležitá, když modernizační pohyb v etnicky složitých státech je spojen s podstatnou demokratizací politického režimu. Politické elity etnických skupin využívají během demokratizačního procesu teritoriální rámce historických etnických území jako klíčové mobilizační prostředky při prosazování jednostranných politických, ekonomických a kulturních cílů vlastních etnických skupin.

Za druhé se příspěvek věnuje obecným způsobům teritoriální autonomie a samosprávy, které mohou přispět k uspořádání různorodých etnonárodních aspirací a požadavků. Vzhledem k velké rozmanitosti jak institucionálních, tak i teritoriálních řešení politických sporů, existuje velký počet uspořádání v rozložení kompetencí a zdrojů mezi etnickými skupinami. Nejprve jsou hodnocena tzv. „konsociatální" uspořádání politických vztahů mezi etnickými skupinami, která jsou založena na podílu na moci a na kooperaci mezi politickými elitami etnických skupin. Tato institucionální uspořádání zakotvují etnickou příslušnost do politického systému a zdů-

razňují etnické hranice a etnopolitická rozhraní. Jako druhá jsou hodnocena t. zv. integrační uspořádání politických vztahů, která se naopak snaží vytvořit institucionální struktury pobízející k podílu na moci založeném na rozptýlené politické moci v územních strukturách etnických skupin. Integrační uspořádání se snaží založit rozdělení moci na konkurenci politických seskupení v rámci vlastních etnických skupin s přesahem do příbuzných politických seskupení v jiných etnických skupinách. Zdá se, že integrační uspořádání moci mohou být více úspěšná v nových státech v regionech postkoloniálního světa. V kombinaci s institucionálními uspořádáními ukazují teritoriální řešení mezietnických konfliktů rovněž velkou variantnost možných uspořádání. Regionalizmus nabízí teritoriální uspořádání, která jsou založena na různých stupních regionální autonomie. Vláda unitárního státu může v rámci regionalistických řešení poskytnout určité kompetence a zdroje regionům etnických skupin. Federální uspořádání jsou založena na ústavní nezvratitelnosti decentralizovaných kompetencí a zdrojů a na jasném dělení moci mezi etnickými regiony a centrální mocí. Rozdělení mezi centrem a periferiemi je ve federálním uspořádání vyváženo uznáním důležitých společných zájmů. Konfederální uspořádání poskytují mnohem volnější vztahy mezi etnickými regiony bez dalekosáhlého omezení jejich suverenity. V konfederálních strukturách není skutečně dominující centrum artikulováno a zúčastněné etnické regiony (státy) mají právo veta ve všech důležitých otázkách. Závěrem je ještě nutné zdůraznit, že variantnost možných uspořádání v rámci řešení regionalizmu, federace a konfederace může být ještě větší při uplatnění asymetrických struktur těchto institucionálních modalit.