

The Europe in the new Millennium: people and population

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Abstract: Nowadays Europe represents 12% of the whole world population; it represented 22% in 1950 and in 2050 it will represent according to the contemporary projections only 7%. Europe has the lowest population growth among other continents. Population is becoming stationary with the pronounced process of demographic ageing. The new European population is going to develop after the political changes in Eastern Europe. All measures of population policy (direct or indirect) are structurally reserved to the national sovereignty. However, a sort of positive features can be found, i.e. the direct elections of the European Parliament, the existence of European passport etc. A collective psychology has been developed, too. Citizens of other countries of the European Union are no more considered as “foreigners” and the content of social policy is approaching (regarding family, job, education, health...); the integration of immigrants will be an integral part of European Union policy after the Euro.

Keywords: European population, integration, demographic trend, social policy

1. A new demographic scenario

At the beginning of the XXI century we would like to speculate upon the future of the whole world population and upon the European population. In particular, as Leridon¹ says, we had a good opportunity from the press, which told about the birth of the child that brought the population of the planet to reach 6 billion. The United Nations celebrated the event on October 12, 1999, succeeding in making the people aware of the recent demographic evolution and the one to be. Anyway, when making forecasts, it is necessary not to make the mistakes made in the past.

Only twenty years ago, in fact, the forecasts were that the world population would reach 12–15 billion after the demographic transition; in 1996 they foretold it would reach 10–12 billion; the last forecast of the United Nations (1998) says that in 2050 the inhabitants of the planet will be about 9 billion.

Forecasts about the year 2000 had also many revisions: in 1973 they foretold (average variance) that the world population would reach 6.254 billion in the year 2000; in 1980 they became 6.116, while in 1990 the forecasts had a new increase: 6.261 billion. So, even if there was a decrease in the demographic growth as the forecasts told, it was even faster than what foreseen. All this was a consequence of what Chesnais² called “mondialisation démographique”, which consists in the decrease of fertility as well as mortality, even if at different rates, almost all over the world.

¹ Leridon H., Six milliards...et après?, in *Population et Sociétés* n. 352, December 1999, Paris.

² Chesnais J.C., La mondialisation démographique: un nouveau regard sur le XXIe siècle, in *Population et Sociétés* n. 318, November 1996, Paris.

Another indicator often considered is the ratio European population/world population: nowadays Europe represents 12% of the population of the planet; in 1950 it represented 22%; in 2050 it will represent 7%. So, the decrease of the European population in the last fifty years has been bigger than the one presumably there will be in the next fifty years (Table 1).

Table 1. European and world population, past and future (in milion of inhabitants)

	1950	2000	2050
Europe	544	726	628
As % of the world population	21.6	12.0	7.0
Africa	221	784	1766
America	339	829	1201
Asia	1402	3683	5628
Oceania	13	30	46
World	2519	6052	8909

Source: UNITED NATIONS, "World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision, Volume I: Comprehensive Tables", New York, 1999.

We agree that nowadays European population is the less dynamic of the world. When we speak about it we immediately think at low fertility; at a population growth, which is almost negative; at the strong ageing; in a few words, the growth of the European population is becoming stationary because of these conditions. Nevertheless in this last decade the dynamics of this population can be considered extraordinary if we stress his "European" character. Through the European interpretation of this aspect we could say that this population has strongly increased in the last ten years going from 421.5 million of 1988 to 745.4 million of 1998. Moreover it has paradoxically grown younger and older at the same time: on one hand the proportion of young people between 0 and 14 years represents about 20% of the global population compared to 17% of the European Union, thanks to the growing presence of Central Eastern countries; at contrary the weight of the aged people raised from 11% to 14% due to the rapid and strong ageing process in Western Europe.

On the other hand, unfortunately, children's mortality has worsened going from 5 to 12‰; and finally the most significant thing is that (in contrast with all appearances) internal mobility has increased while international migration has diminished. Here mobility of study and of occupation has become the dominant factor, even if the media deal less with this topic; in the meanwhile it is more evident the migration from non-European countries to the old continent, even if their integration is still causing problems and discussions and in the future this will be the source of political and institutional innovations in order to control this mobility.

Are these considerations paradoxical? It may be. But the new European population that is going to develop after the political changes of Eastern Europe seems very different from the sum of the previous national populations; something similar happened in the European

Union where a model of European demography, uniformly characterized (even if with strong regional differences), is going to be placed upon the former national characterization.

You can consider, for instance, the family model which has gone from a traditional marriage system to several and different ways of constitution, reconstitution, annulment and organization of the different generations of the family; the fertility condition which nowadays has conformed to the Community standard, that is, below the substitution level of the generations both in Northern and Southern Europe; the implications to the structure of retirement age modified by the lengthening of the average life duration and by the scarce replacement of human beings due to a lower birth-rate; the problems of reorganization of secondary education and the job market with a reduced number of young people; the new and very different relationships among the generations with the presence in the economy of the family of both young grown-ups and very old people; the acquired consideration of internal mobility and of integrated populations for the Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Greek and other people present in France, Germany, Benelux, Great Britain and so on.

The European population is born and the new Central Eastern populations of the continent will adapt themselves in the future. By now they keep on having strong national and ethnic characterizations: looking at tables 2–4, an European demographic profile seems to be a robust scenario around the following ten parameters:

Growth rate: around 0.3%

Natural increase: around 0.2%

Crude birth rate: around 10‰

Total period fertility rate: around 1.6

Crude death rate: around 9‰

Infant mortality: around 5‰

Expectation of life, males: around 74

Expectation of life, females: around 81

Population structure, age 0–14: around 17%

Population structure, age over 65: around 16%

The variance is different for each parameter, specially as far as infant and general mortality are concerned; and obviously some particular sub-populations in Europe differ considerably for individual parameters and the timing of the demographic transition.

In particular in table 4 we calculated the range. It is given from the difference between the highest and the lowest value of a distribution. We haven't considered the two highest and lowest values of each class so that our analysis could be more significant without the influence of extreme values. Looking at table 4 we can easily see that the range values are wider in the Council of Europe countries than in the European Union countries. Moreover for the most part of indicators range values are almost the same for Council of Europe and Other countries. So we can say that there is a large variability for some indicators and that this variability is wider in the group Other countries, the European Union being more homogeneous.

By now they keep on having strong national and ethnic characterizations: among them the Balkan ones represent the most exasperated forms; but in some cases an evolution is already evident. From a European point of view you can think at the mobility of Polish

Table 2. Main demographic indicators in Europe

Country	Growth rate % 1997	Rate of natural increase % 1997	Rate of net migration % 1997	Crude birth rate ‰ 1997	Total period fertility rate 1997	Crude death rate ‰ 1997	Infant Mortality ‰ 1997	Life expectancy	
								M	F
Austria	0.10	0.06	0.04	10.40	1.36	9.80	4.70	74.30	80.60
Belgium	0.18	0.12	0.06	11.40	1.55	10.20	6.10	74.00	80.80
Denmark	0.37	0.15	0.22	12.80	1.75	11.30	5.60	72.90	78.00
Finland	0.27	0.23	0.07	11.50	1.74	9.60	3.90	73.40	80.50
France	0.40	0.33	0.07	12.40	1.71	9.10	4.80	73.60	81.70
Germany*	0.24	-0.11	0.35	9.70	1.32	10.80	5.00	73.00	79.50
Greece*	0.20	0.01	0.21	9.70	1.32	9.60	6.30	75.10	80.30
Ireland*	0.58	0.57	0.06	14.30	1.92	8.60	6.20	72.30	77.90
Italy	0.18	-0.04	0.22	9.20	1.22	9.60	5.50	74.10	74.10
Luxembourg	1.27	0.37	0.90	13.10	1.71	9.40	4.20	73.50	73.50
Netherlands	0.56	0.35	0.21	12.20	1.54	8.70	5.10	74.70	74.70
Portugal	0.23	0.08	0.15	11.40	1.46	10.50	6.40	71.30	71.30
Spain	0.13	0.03	0.09	9.20	1.15	8.90	5.50	74.40	74.40
Sweden	0.04	-0.03	0.07	10.20	1.53	10.50	3.60	76.50	76.50
United Kingdom	0.32	0.16	0.16	12.30	1.71	10.70	5.90	74.30	74.30
Avg. EU	0.34	0.15	0.19	11.32	1.53	9.82	5.25	73.83	80.08
Albania*	1.96	1.96		21.80	3.03	5.60	30.70	69.60	75.50
Andorra	0.61	0.82	-0.20	11.20		3.00	1.40		
Bulgaria	-0.70	-0.70	0.00	7.70	1.09	14.70	15.60	67.20	74.40
Croatia*	-0.69	0.08	-0.76	12.10	1.69	11.40	8.10	68.60	75.90
Cyprus	0.69	0.63	0.06	14.20	2.00	7.90	8.00	75.30	79.80
Czech Republic	-0.10	-0.21	0.12	8.80	1.17	10.90	5.90	70.50	77.50
Estonia	-0.57	-0.41	-0.16	8.70	1.24	12.70	10.10	64.70	76.00
Hungary	-0.38	-0.38	0.00	9.90	1.38	13.70	9.90	66.10	74.70
Iceland	0.93	0.85	0.03	15.30	2.04	6.80	5.50	76.40	81.30
Latvia	-0.87	-0.60	-0.27	7.60	1.11	13.60	15.30	64.20	75.90
Liechtenstein	0.57	0.66	-0.09	13.50	1.33	7.10	7.40		
Lithuania	-0.09	-0.09	0.00	10.20	1.39	11.10	10.30	65.90	76.80
Macedonia*	0.55	0.65	0.02	14.80	1.90	8.30	15.70	70.10	74.00
Malta	0.67	0.51	0.16	12.90	1.95	7.70	6.40	74.90	79.80
Moldova	-0.17	0.06	-0.23	10.60	1.60	10.00	19.80	62.90	70.40
Norway	0.58	0.35	0.24	13.60	1.86	10.10	4.10	75.50	81.00
Poland	0.06	0.09	-0.03	10.70	1.51	9.80	10.20	68.50	77.00
Romania	-0.25	-0.19	-0.06	10.50	1.32	12.40	22.00	65.30	73.10
Russia	-0.27	-0.51	0.24	8.60	1.28	13.70	17.30	61.00	73.10
San Marino	1.40	0.25	1.15	11.20	1.24	6.90	10.60	73.20	79.10
Slovak Republic	0.16	0.13	0.03	11.00	1.47	9.70	8.70	68.80	76.70
Slovenia	0.08	-0.04	0.12	9.10	1.25	9.50	5.20	71.00	78.60
Switzerland	0.17	0.25	-0.08	11.40	1.48	8.90	4.80	76.10	82.20
Turkey	1.64	1.25	0.12	21.60	2.48	6.50	42.20	65.90	70.50
Ukraine*	-0.76	-0.58	-0.18	10.00	1.40	15.40	14.70	62.80	73.20
Avg. Other Countries Eur	0.21	0.20	0.01	11.88	1.59	9.90	12.40	68.89	76.37
Avg. Council of Europe	0.28	0.18	0.10	11.60	1.56	9.86	8.63	71.36	78.23

* Latest available data

Source: Council of Europe 1999, Recent demographic developments in Europe 1998.

Table 3. Population by age groups

Country	Population on 1st January 1998, in thousand	Population 0-14		Population 65+	
		A.V.	%	A.V.	%
Austria	8075.4	1386.6	17.17	1244	15.40
Belgium	10192.3	1807.3	17.73	1687.7	16.47
Denmark	5249.9	952.2	17.98	791.5	14.95
Finland	5147.3	961.4	18.68	752.5	14.62
France	58722.6	11179.3	19.04	9172.4	15.62
Germany*	82012.2	13187.2	16.08	12856.8	15.68
Greece*	10507.6	1669.1	15.88	1712.3	16.30
Ireland*	3652.2	849	23.25	415.9	11.39
Italy	57563.4	8382.5	14.56	10012	17.39
Luxembourg	423.7	79.3	18.72	60.4	14.26
Netherlands	15654.2	2882.9	18.42	2109.7	13.48
Portugal	9957.3	1695.6	17.03	1500.8	15.07
Spain	39347.9	6141.6	15.61	6340.1	16.11
Sweden	8847.6	1654.5	18.70	1542.4	17.43
United Kingdom	59086.4	11366.6	19.24	9259.9	15.67
Total EU	374485	64195.1	17.15	59449.4	15.87
Albania*	3249	1070.8	32.96	198.7	6.12
Andorra	65.3	10	15.31	7.5	11.49
Bulgaria	8283.2	1387.5	16.75	1294.1	15.62
Croatia*	4565.4	909.6	19.92	563.3	12.34
Cyprus	746.1	180.7	24.22	83.3	11.16
Czech Republic	10299.1	1795	17.43	1401.9	13.61
Estonia	1453.8	279.3	19.21	205.4	14.13
Hungary	10135.4	1771.7	17.48	1462.5	14.43
Iceland	272.4	64.6	23.72	31.5	11.56
Latvia	2458.4	473.3	19.25	351.4	14.29
Liechtenstein	31.3	5.9	18.85	3.2	10.22
Lithuania	3704	771.1	20.82	470.7	12.71
Macedonia*	1990.5	312.7	15.71	180.9	9.09
Malta	376.5	80	21.25	44.5	11.82
Moldova	4312.7	1113.2	25.81	393.1	9.11
Norway	4417.6	872.9	19.76	691.8	15.66
Poland	38660	8169.5	21.13	4518.8	11.69
Romania	22526.1	4335.9	19.25	2865.9	12.72

Table 3. – Continuation

Country	Population on 1st January 1998, in thousand	Population 0-14		Population 65+	
		A.V.	%	A.V.	%
Russia	146806.4	29028.8	19.77	18414.7	12.54
San Marino	25.9	3.8	14.67	4	15.44
Slovak Republic	5387.7	1133.6	21.04	605.3	11.24
Slovenia	1984.9	339.1	17.08	262.4	13.22
Switzerland	7093.5	1247.5	17.59	1065.5	15.02
Turkey	64269	19876	30.93	3256.4	5.07
Ukraine*	51333.9	10532	20.52	6984.1	13.61
Tot. Other Countries Eur	394448	85764.5	21.73	45360.9	11.50
Total Council of Europe	768933	149959.6	19.50	104810.3	13.63

* Latest available data

Source: Council of Europe 1999, Recent demographic developments in Europe 1998.

Table 4. Range of demographic indicators

	Growth rate	Rate of natural increase	Rate of net migration	Crude birth rate	Total period fertility rate
European Union	0.43	0.43	0.15	2.2	0.42
Other countries	2.10	1.43	0.39	6.7	0.87
Council of Europe Countries	2.10	1.43	0.58	6.7	0.89
Xmax-Xavg (**)	0.98 Max. Albania	1.78 Max. Albania	1.05 Max. San Marino	10.2 Max. Albania	1.47 Max. Albania
Xmin-Xavg (**)	1.15 Min. Latvia	0.78 Min. Latvia	0.86 Min. Croatia	4 Min. Latvia	0.47 Min. Bulgaria

Table 4. – Continuation

	Crude death rate	Infant mortality	Life expectancy		Population structure	
			M	F	0–14	65 +
European Union	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.9	3.16	2.21
Other countries	7.2	17.2	12.6	7.9	10.1	6.35
Council of Europe Countries	7.2	18.1	12.6	8.4	10.2	7.38
Xmax-Xavg (**)	5.54 Max.Ukraine	33.37 Max.Turkey	5.04 Max. Iceland	3.97 Max. Switzerland	13.82 Max.Albania	3.69 Max.Sweden
Xmin-Xavg (**)	6.86 Min.Andorra	7.43 Min.Andorra	10.36 Min. Russia	7.73 Min.Turkey	4.58 Min.Italy	8.87 Min.Turkey

(*) MAX(VALUE)-MIN(VALUE) ,excluding the two highest and lowest values of each class.

(**) including the two highest and lowest values of each class.

citizens nowadays compared to that of ten years ago; or at that of Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Rumanian (in the future) towards other European countries. The passage from international migration to internal mobility in the common economic space seems to be outlined. In this space there has not been the wave of migratory flow expected in the past from Eastern Europe; yet there have been other forms of migratory attraction of these nations to the neighbouring populations but outside the European space (up to now): the Turkish migratory flow in Ukraine, for instance.

2. International and internal migration in Europe

On this profile we can introduce the migration system: both as far as flows and stokes are concerned. In this case the migration profile of the European population is not robust at all: and consequently the net migration rate is a value of very difficult estimation. Two main issues can affect the migration component of the European population profile in the next future: the individual adjustment of some sub-populations and the demographic transition in the neighbour populations.

The first component will be surely affected more by the economic and social evolution of the so called process of enlargement of the European Union, than by the demographic evolution of the European population. On the contrary on the second component the demographic transition of the North-African, Arab and Caucasian populations will probably have a deeper influence.

In order to depict the European Union, we shouldn't forget such migration. We know that birth and death rates can be analysed in the long run and according to continuity, except for interruptions due to phenomena like wars or natural catastrophes; instead, the intensity of migration may vary considerably during a short period of time because of phenomena sometimes hard to overcome, like what recently happened in Albania, Kosovo

or in the Balkan states, countries on which nowadays the world focuses the attention for reasons that are dramatic. Anyway, the whole Mediterranean area is concerned with serious even if less spectacular demographic movements.

We can state that the Mediterranean area itself is one that undertook a lot of changes, each due to a different reason. Recent events now belonging to history regarding France or Germany emphasize that the presence of the “foreigner” could give place to cultural contrasts and to their degenerations like xenophobia and racism. Even recent episodes of racial intolerance regarding our country have their roots in the cultural background that already gave place to anti-Semitism.

At present Italy is an immigration country even if in the past years it still was an emigrating country; such transition developed in the declining phase of our emigration and was rapid indeed; the first CENSIS figures belonging to more than a decade ago stated that immigrants were about 300–400,000; more recent figures of “Ministero degli Interni” state that they are largely more than one million, 60% of which illegal. They come especially from developing countries and the intensity of immigration varies. Its origin is to be found in the lack of balance between the demographic and economic conditions of the developing countries – they are not able to employ all their workforce.

In order to control migration it is necessary nowadays to know the reasons for expulsion; so, a regulation of migration flux could be experimented only cooperating with the developing countries helping them to avoid the reasons for emigration. Such a project is also evidence of solidarity and far-sighted policy if existing at the right time: for EU countries a common policy could give place to a global control of immigration. We can say that immigration toward Europe, especially on its coasts, is to go on – it is difficult to state if the current flux will be always the same, especially in the long run.

Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey at present have, on the whole, about 200 million inhabitants and their population is always growing, even if at a decreasing rate due to the transition towards a developed demography. The relationship between demographic growth and increase in the number of jobs available will be, for the above mentioned countries, bigger of 20% according to the demographic growth.

It is easy to forecast that for at least 10–15 years the flux toward Europe coming from such countries is going to increase. But forecasts tell us also that the same developing countries will be able to grow of other 100 million inhabitants, becoming 300 million on the whole in the year 2020. We haven't got the figures relating the growth rate of jobs vs incomes during the same period of time. Anyway, we still can't say that the growth will be bigger than 60%. Western countries have got a demographic growth rate of 0.5%, the developing countries of 2.4%. We know that when the internal resources of a country can't satisfy the internal needs, the immediate solution is emigration. The young coming from North Africa will have to look for possibilities to survive and to find a better life-style for them and their families.

Some of them will move toward countries where to find a better life, maybe in the five countries on the Mediterranean coasts. Anyway, we have to bear in mind that such countries are facing problems similar to those of the home countries. So, the reasons for emigration, especially toward Europe, will be stronger and stronger and difficult to manage, because of the fragility of the political-administrative structure of some developing countries and the lack of agreements that allow legal relations immigration country/emigration country.

3. International migrations and international relations

International balance has to face the political and economic relationships with the countries in which emigration has its origin and the problems of EU countries that have to afford similar problems. International balance should come especially from the awareness that there are some problems in common; 150 million of EU European citizens are giving hospitality to about 15 million non-EU-citizens; within 20 years the first ones will become 300 million, the others 25–30 million. Two worlds will meet, Europe and Africa, on European land, with an European social and economic structure.

Migration flux involving Europe, Italy and the Mediterranean are a reality, so, resolute interventions are necessary. They should be similar for each country guaranteeing everybody human, civil and political rights. They should overcome the existing differences between citizen and “foreigner”. All that requires a European and international social policy overcoming the distance between foreign and home politics. Local authorities could carry out proper interventions giving place to a new kind of international relationships.

European social policy should change in a cooperation between the tradition immigration countries bearing in mind the aim to achieve solidarity policies, until a minimum income will be introduced everywhere for everybody. Article 8 from Maastricht treaty introduces the sense of citizenship inside the EU: EU citizen is everyone who is citizen of a member of the EU. He has got the rights and duties stated by the Treaty, for which each EU citizen can circulate and stay freely inside the member countries, except for the limits of the Treaty itself.

Nowadays it is obvious that for a lot of migrants being a citizen of Europe is not the same of being a citizen in their home country, according to constitutional, social, moral, ethic and civil point of view. A modern and humanitarian spirit, some help to the home countries, proper settlement of non EU citizens inside the economic, civil and social European context, respect for the fundamental human rights are the leading features of a European migration policy inside a true social European context. It is the preface for a multicultural and multiethnic pacific European project, a pre-communitarian process involving the whole Mediterranean area, similar to the one we had in the past with the European Council. From this point of view a communitarian policy should be preferred to national policies existing today, but also the involvement of national and regional European governments, especially of Mediterranean countries could be of example, considering the usual migration policies of the traditional continental immigration countries.

More than a half than the citizens of the fifteen countries members of the EU sometimes or very often feels European. In all the countries, everyone is becoming aware to belong not only to a country, but to be also European: a common identity which, as an important element of European citizenship, preserving the diversity of the different national features, will be a further important European distinguishing element, that Europeans have never owned before. For this, it is necessary, as Jacques Delors said, that everybody is involved in the change: “Each of us has to be involved in order to create the citizens Europe (...), that is we should have deeper roots for our common project, if we want it is clear and effective”.

4. Is Europe conscious of having its own European population?

We should answer negatively considering that all the measures (direct or indirect) referred to the population are structurally reserved to the national sovereignty: as well as it is written in the conclusions of the International Conference on the Population and the Development of Cairo (1994). A sort of positive answer can be found in the first steps of the European citizens (direct elections of the European Parliament, European passport and other similar issues), but also in a collective psychology, destined to be developed, which tends not to consider as “foreigners” other citizens of the European Union.

The evolution of the process that brought to the European union took us to consider as internal migrations those that, even after the Second World War, were thought as international migrations. It is difficult to appreciate the importance of such change without taking in mind the features of migrations in Europe and the debate that went with them at least until the half of the seventies. The populations involved in the countries of origin were especially those of the less developed regions of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece; then Yugoslavia and Turkey; afterwards Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, without considering Germany and some ethnic minorities. The countries interested in welcoming such important fluxes were Benelux, Germany, France and Switzerland, with particular features the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries; later on, Italy and Spain, then also other Mediterranean countries or countries of the Eastern Europe, as we can see today. Internal policies, bilateral and multilateral agreements, negotiations or decisions represent political instruments of great interest. The foundations of such evolution, from free circulation to the control of fluxes, to the integration policies, express some of the most radical changes that Europe generated in the second half of the last century, even if they aren't part of institutional structures or procedures.

Considering in particular the European Union, we can observe that the principle of the free circulation of goods, capital and people took really to processes of internal movements similar to those movements inside the single European countries. Such changes are very important if we think to the various positions taken, during a short period, by the fluxes and by the communities of Italians, Spanish, Greek and Portuguese in the other countries of the European Union. It is easy not only to support the numeric importance of such communities, but also their new position inside the institutional, legal, social welfare, educational, social and psychological system of the countries welcoming them.

Of greater interest the consideration that the same migratory, demographic and institutional transition began to get in touch recently with other communities of migrants: in particular those that have their origin in countries neighbouring the future “stops” of the communitarian expansion. The Polish, Czech, Hungarian fluxes and communities, for instance, at first were secondary migrations, and now they are becoming migrations with a project and an aim of integration; the same thing, but in a more exasperated form, is happening with Albanian migrations recalling what happened for fluxes and communities of migrants in the Balkan and central-eastern area.

So, in a period of time of about a century – half passed – we find a migratory dynamics inside a demographic dynamics, which involves an internal reorganisation through the mobility of the European population. Many similarities and differences can be found comparing the phenomenon to national demographic processes, for example the one of the

Italian population from 1861 to the Second World War. For them the internal migrations, considering demographic issues, emigration and xenophobic behaviours, turned into a long story similar to the European dynamics to follow.

5. How do the neighbouring populations see the European population?

Here the answer is connected with the effect, not only of image, that the great European market at first and then the Euro have created in consideration of a political and economic European space, united and “reserved” to its population. It is not a demographic issue at the origin of the process of the European union: that is, it was not a European population to wish the creation of its own state. But, once the European Union is developed, we can make the hypothesis to create also a European population.

Such constant demographic union can be evaluated from the point of view of its internal convergence toward a common demographic dynamics and of its eventual homogeneity compared to different dynamics of other areas of the world.

According to the first point of view, it is wise to study the convergence of the various European national demographics in the view of a common demographic pattern. Its features are, as we know, the strong decrease of child mortality, the demographic ageing in progress caused by the increase of life expectancy and by the strong decrease of birth rate and fertility; by the changes of the family patterns; by the new relationships – good or not – among young and old; by the strong interesting regional and ethnic variances that are converging toward the European demographic scenery.

Populations neighbouring the European area are converging into such European population in progress; among these, the Mediterranean Maghreb populations and some populations coming from the Middle-East, giving place to an interesting Euro-Mediterranean mix, with an advanced demographic transition.

The demographic internal variance of such group of populations is, as we told before, still strong; but its convergence toward the demographic European reference pattern is not so strong and very fast.

In this perspective analysis, the comparison with different demographic poles is encouraging; they are more or less homogeneous from the inner point of view and very different in the transition stage and in some demographic basis compared to the European pattern.

Without considering in detail the demographic patterns of these other groups, we can consider the demographic Chinese group, the Indian, the one of the African sub-Saharan area, the North-American; while we could have doubts about a specific demographic pattern of the Latin-American.

Comparing such demographic patterns it is obviously interesting to observe the different features and the internal variability of the main demographic parameters. More interesting the observation and analysis of the demographic features of the border populations among these groups. The Euro-Asian populations from Siberia to the Caucasian area, Afghans and Bangladeshi, Iranians and Iraqi, Ethiopians and Eritreans, Senegalese and Mauritians are examples, with populations, ethnic groups and sometimes tribal systems of a demographic group, historically, and with the perspective,

to be seismic; inside it, structures, natural movements and settlements of the population can still give the origin to important migratory movements.

Their observation and the cooperation for their development, more than their isolation, could be of great interest for a better understanding of the demographic future of many areas of our planet.

As well as the little Europe, that of the Union, has become in the long run and with its Community changes a field of attraction for a more extended area of the world, maybe also the Europe of the forty one members states of the European Council will become a quite homogeneous demographic area with a nimble internal mobility determined by the economic processes and structures; and with a force of attraction of international migratory flows coming from the neighbouring countries? To the East towards China? To the South towards the Sahara? This view, if consolidated, slightly changes the definition of "neighbouring", that is of adjacent populations both from our and from their point of view. And it tends to identify also some areas demographically more homogeneous in their internal but very different among them, both in the actual situation and in the demographic dynamics: European, Chinese, sub-Saharan world with populations characterised by regional instability and ethnic differences but with specific features depending on the evolution of their demographic transition.

6. Europe new challenge: the social policy

The recent European history includes many steps that should be remembered as peculiar for the European union. Anyway, some of them, more than others, mark the historical change characterizing the whole process, stressing the passage from a system of national independent states often in quarrel, to a union of national autonomies, interdependent and federate.

After the Second World War, the genesis of the European Common Market stresses the common will to afford the economic, energetic and technological interdependence with better perspectives, considering the protectionism and the abuse of the past.

The evolution of such an origin, at first in European communities and then in the European Community, marks the institutional extension which takes more importance than the economic dimension; especially comparing it to similar but alternative solutions of neighbouring areas such as, for instance, the European Area of Free Exchange. With the process that brought the number of the member countries from six to fifteen, to increase in the next few years, such sort of federation reached other two goals that made it irreversible: the direct election with universal suffrage of the European Parliament of Strasbourg and the monetary union with the Euro. Of both we know the innovations they took with themes well as their limits; we surely remember their long and difficult genesis and the national compromises involved. To be noted the ups and downs of a powerful and advanced economic system compared to a European institutional and political system still incomplete.

We should stress that the member countries and the Communitarian institutions, thanks to the economic, productive, technological and financial interdependence found resources and procedures to afford and decide common policies regarding development and structures; in a way that Europe was "criticized" for creating an economic giant and a politic dwarf.

Also the economic integration had and is having its limits: but, from agricultural policies to structural funds, from the different "common policies" to the monetary union, the measures able to support the creation of the communitarian economy in the last fifty years have increased.

Anyway, the situation is different from the social point of view, for which the interdependence of the national dimensions is perhaps stronger of the economic one, but, where the ability to create an authentic Europe found, with some exceptions, some limits.

We often stressed the homogeneity of the European demographic pattern, even if with some regional differences. But we should also remember the seriousness of some social situations today in every European country: ageing and the crisis of social welfare; radical changes in the job market and unemployment, especially for young; a better quality of life and the uselessness of the old health service; sometimes more emargination for some categories of citizens; the fragility of the whole system when affording manifestations regarding health, crime, behaviours and migrations.

We could go on naming situations of crisis regarding the more advanced pattern of political and economic development in the world, but only to stress that the coincidence of its manifestation during the same period in many countries, hasn't given place yet to the effect reached in other economic fields: the association of the interdependence of the events to common solutions.

Such could be the probable evolution of the European Union: the Union after the Euro will probably be a social Europe. It probably will have to support the progresses of territorial increase, institutional renewal and economic strength of the European Union. But the lack of a strong political involvement regarding the modern social changes could compromise the progress of the Union.

Anyway, with the experience of the past, we can observe that when there were similar risks for the creation of the European Union and for its economic-monetary solidity, the governments of the European countries found the way of the institutional strength and of the economic-monetary union.

We can say that if the choices are not far-sighted, the need to afford important changes regarding structures, behaviours and social needs will help the European Union to find out new policies in such field, for example the policies regarding migrations, welcoming, coexistence, solidarity and cooperation.

Not only in the long run, but also in the next few years the social policies (regarding family, job, education, health.....), among them the ones regarding welcoming and integration of the migrants, will be an integral part of the European Union after the Euro. For them the distinction between member states or not will be slighter because the propagation of social interdependence among all the countries will be stronger and faster of the economic and monetary one.

Presenting a new original Report on social Europe at the summit of the Heads of Government in Lisbon (March 2000), the European Union maybe reached the awareness of this new reality and opened, in new terms, the debate about the social problems in Europe in the new Millennium.

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EVROPA V NOVÉM TISÍCILETÍ: LIDÉ A POPULACE

Résumé

Podíl Evropy na světovém obyvatelstvu se významně mění. Jestliže v roce 1950 představovala 22 % světového obyvatelstva, v současné době je to pouze 12 % a v roce 2050 bude podle současných prognóz její podíl jen 7 %. Z tohoto hlediska má dnes Evropa nejmenší populační růst na světě blížící se nule s perspektivou záporného růstu. Důsledkem je přiblížení se stacionárnímu typu věkové struktury a demografické stárnutí. Evropská Unie se rozšiřuje a země východní Evropy mají jinou věkovou strukturu i odlišné demografické chování. Je však možno předpokládat, že v blízké budoucnosti se bude celá rozšířená Evropa z hlediska demografického chování opět homogenizovat.

Dochází však k vytvoření evropské populace? Na tuto otázku je nutno v současné době odpovědět ještě záporně. Populační politika je výhradou jednotlivých suverénních států jak bylo zdůrazněno na Světové populační konferenci o populaci a rozvoji v Káhiře roku 1994. Pouze určité náznaky vedou k vytvoření evropské populace (přímé volby do Evropského parlamentu, společný evropský pas apod.). Také v psychologii dochází postupně k určitým změnám; občané jiných států Evropské unie již nejsou považováni za cizince. V příštích letech lze také očekávat přiblížování sociální politiky (vzhledem k rodinám, zaměstnání, dětem, zdraví ...) i politiky vztahující se na imigranty a jejich integraci. Sociální politika se v budoucnu stane integrální součástí Evropské unie a bude to další krok po zavedení Eura.