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Transactional systems, territoriality and the example of Brussels: reflection on the notion of the economic base of metropolitan areas

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Abstract: This article focuses on two geographical aspects of the interaction between the allocative and redistributive function of federal and local governments: first, the way in which household income activities depend on spatial conditions, and second, the manipulation of territoriality by higher income groups in order to pass the cost of supplying collective goods to lower income groups. The theoretical concepts of "spheres of economic integration" (Kesteloot) and of "regimes" (Terhorst and van de Ven) are used to examine the fundamental notions of the economic base and the metropolitan area. It is argued that the economic base cannot be reduced to tax-generating activities and that the metropolitan area should be conceived of as the territorialized habitat of households in spatial settings, rather than as a group of territorial communities, ruled by a two- or three-tiered set of local or federal governments.

Key words: economic integration, regimes, economic base, metropolitan area, Brussels

1. Introduction

The economic base of capital cities and metropolitan areas may initially be defined as the group of productive activities that generate taxable incomes, property and consumption. The receipts derived from taxes should enable the public authorities involved to pursue a financial policy aimed at strengthening the competitiveness of the cities and other areas involved in the increasingly international and global economy. In general, the financial policy of the central government performs four functions: allocation, redistribution, economic stabilization and monetary stabilization. The first two functions are also performed by the financial policy of the local government. The allocative function refers to the attempt to influence the allocation of factors of production in private enterprises and to supply collective goods in order to optimize the means of production and spending. It relates directly to the development and administration of the economic base of the central and local government. The redistributive function refers to intervention in the distribution of income by means of taxes, transfers and the provision of social goods. It is oriented not towards the development of the economic base but rather towards the management of the fruits of this development. Nevertheless, the redistributive function has an impact on the economic base because it can influence the locational preferences of enterprises by creating an attractive climate for investment. Therefore, it should not be neglected in the study of the development and administration of the economic base.

This article focuses on two geographical aspects of the interaction between the allocative and redistributive functions: first, the way in which household income activities depend on spatial conditions, and second, the manipulation of territoriality by higher income groups in order to pass on the cost of supplying collective goods to lower income groups. We shall make use of the theoretical concepts of "spheres of economic integration" and of "regimes", as developed by Kesteloot (1996a) and Terhorst and Van de Ven (1997), to examine the fundamental notions of the economic base and the metropolitan area. First, we explore the connections between the sources of fiscal and non-fiscal revenue for national and local governments, and the composition of household incomes. These connections are represented schematically in Figure 2. The diagram reproduced here was initially designed to analyze the peculiar situation of the Brussels urban region. Throughout this article, we shall use the case of Brussels as an example to make our analysis more concrete. Consequently, our examination of the sources of state revenue and household income is preceded by a sketch of the sociogeographical structure, and the atypical governmental structure of Brussels.

2. The sociogeographical and governmental structure of Brussels

Brussels is indeed an atypical case. On the one hand, it is a federated entity, a member state of a federal state, Belgium; on the other hand, it is a regional economy, as contrasted with a national economy. In general the national state is losing economic power to two sub-national units: the regions (in the sense of politic-administrative units), which are attempting to obtain governmental autonomy; and large cities, which are operating as regional economic units. Brussels is unusual because it is both a federated state and a large city operating as a regional economy. However, the Brussels Capital Region (BCR) member state is considerably smaller than the urban region or even the agglomeration (Figure 1). The urban region is composed of the (morphological) agglomeration – a continuous built-up area – and a series of suburbs and functionally urbanized municipalities that show strong relations with the central city and the agglomeration (through commuting and shopping, for example). In comparison with the rest of the agglomeration and the urban region, the BCR is characterized by a weak demography, a high percentage of foreigners (particularly from the Maghreb and Turkey), a high percentage of dwellings lacking basic conveniences, a high percentage of persons unemployed and registered for employment, a low income per inhabitant and a low standard of living (Table 1). A number of municipalities (small towns and functionally urbanized villages with an old housing stock) outside the BCR also have a high percentage of dwellings lacking basic conveniences. There is also a contrast, in the percentages of foreigners and of persons unemployed and registered for employment, between the Flemish and the Walloon municipalities belonging to the urban region outside the agglomeration.

There are also sharp internal contrasts between the 19 municipalities that make up the BCR. Fourteen of them belong to two extreme categories, being either: (i) municipalities with a large or moderate number of foreigners from the Maghreb and Turkey, characterized by very high percentages of dwellings that lack basic conveniences, very high percentages of persons unemployed and registered for employment, very low incomes per inhabitant and very low standards of living; or (ii) municipalities with a majority of non-



Figure 1. The Brussels urban region

Medi-terranean foreigners from within the European Union (EU), characterized by very low percentages of dwellings that lack basic conveniences, low or moderate percentages of persons unemployed and registered for employment, very high incomes per inhabitant and very high standards of living (Table 1). The basic explanation for these contrasts is well known. Since the middle of the twentieth century, the skilled and affluent population groups have moved from the congested and unsafe central city towards the more congenial and spacious residential areas in the suburbs and the countryside. The unskilled and poor population groups – such as elderly people, working-class families, marginalized population groups, singles and one-parent families – remained in the old city districts, most of which were working-class areas dating from the 19th-century period of industrialization. In many cases, Mediterranean guest-workers and their families took the place of the young people who had become more affluent and left these areas. Since 1996, the population of the BCR has been increasing. In 12 of the 19 municipalities, the number of inhabitants in 2000 was greater than in 1991. However, this demographic change is not reflected in the fiscal capacity of the BCR (Table 2).

The government of Brussels is indeed complicated. The Belgian federal state is made up of three regions: the BCR, the Flemish Region and the Walloon Region. Brussels is one of 19 municipalities that make up the BCR, and it is also the capital city of the European Union, of Belgium, of the BCR and of the Flemish Region/Community. The state is also divided into four language regions. These language regions have not powers, but delineate

Table 1. The sociogeographic structure of the urban region of Brussels

	Population 1981	Population 1991	Population 2000	% growth 1981–91	% growth 1991–00	Net migration 1989–93	% foreigners 1991	Type foreigners 1991	% lack of conven. 1991	% unem-ployed 1991	income 1994	standard of living 1991
Brussels Capital Region												
	997,293	**954,045**	**959,318**	**-4.34**	**0.55**							
1. Anderlecht	97,764	87,884	87,812	-7.26	-0.08	--	xxxxx	MP	xxxxx	xxxxx	xx	LL
2. Auderghem	30,435	29,224	28,804	-3.98	-1.44	--	xxxxx	E M	x	xx	xxxxx	HH
3. Berchem-Ste Agathe	18,719	18,489	18,735	-1.23	1.33	+	xxxx	MP	xx	xxx	xxxxx	M
4. Brussels	139,678	136,424	133,859	-2.33	-1.88	---	xxxxx	PM	xxxxx	xxxxx	x	LL
5. Etterbeek	44,218	38,894	39,404	-12.04	1.31	---	xxxxx	emp	xxxx	xxxxx	xx	LL
6. Evere	30,520	29,229	31,348	-4.23	7.25	--	xxxx	PM	xx	xxxx	xxxx	M
7. Forest	50,607	46,437	45,555	-8.24	-1.90	---	xxxx	MP	xxxxx	xxxxx	xxx	LL
8. Ganshoren	21,445	20,422	19,757	-4.77	-3.26	--	xxxx	emp	x	xxx	xxxxx	M
9. Ixelles	75,723	72,610	73,174	-4.11	0.78	---	xxxxx	emp	xxxxx	xxxxx	xx	LL
10. Jette	40,109	38,423	39,749	-4.20	3.45	-	xxxx	emp	xx	xxxx	xxxxx	M
11. Koekelberg	16,643	16,136	16,211	-3.05	0.46	+	xxxxx	E M	xxxx	xxxxx	xx	LL
12. Molenbeek St Jean	70,850	68,759	71,219	-2.95	3.58	---	xxxxx	PM	xxxxx	xxxxx	x	LL
13. Schaarbeek	106,754	102,702	105,692	-3.80	2.91	---	xxxxx	PM	xxxxx	xxxxx	x	LL
14. St Gilles	46,076	42,684	45,458	-7.36	6.50	---	xxxxx	MP	xxxxx	xxxxx	x	LL
15. St Josse ten Noode	20,381	21,317	22,097	4.59	3.66	---	xxxxx	P	xxxxx	xxxxx	x	LL
16. Uccle	76,004	73,721	74,221	-3.00	0.68	---	xxxx	E M	x	xxx	xxxxx	HH
17. Watermael-Boitsfort	24,880	24,567	24,773	-1.26	0.84	---	xxxx	E M	x	xx	xxxxx	HH
18. Woluwe-St Lambert	48,801	47,963	46,528	-1.72	-2.99	---	xxxx	E M	x	xxx	xxxxx	HH
19. Woluwe-St Pierre	40,686	38,160	37,922	-6.21	-0.62	---	xxxxx	E M	x	xx	xxxxx	HH

Table 1. – continuation

	Population 1981	Population 1991	Population 2000	% growth 1981–91	% growth 1991–00	Net migration 1989–93	% foreigners 1991	Type foreigners 1991	% lack of conven. 1991	% unem-ployed 1991	income 1994	standard of living 1991
The rest of the agglomeration												
	355,715	**369,643**	**383,035**	**3.92**	**3.62**							
Flemish Region												
Beersel	20,955	22,195	22,880	5.92	3.09	++	xxx	E M	xx	xx	xxxxxx	HH
Dilbeek	35,050	36,859	37,722	5.16	2.34	++	xx	E M	x	x	xxxxxx	HH
Drogenbos	4,866	4,780	4,693	-1.77	-1.82	+	xxx	ME	xx	xxx	xxxx	M
Grimbergen	32,038	32,120	32,930	0.26	2.52	++	xxx	E M	x	x	xxxxxx	HH
Halle	32,312	32,768	33,655	1.41	2.71	++	xx	emp	xxxx	xx	xxxxx	M
Kraainem	11,780	12,527	12,692	6.34	1.32	--	xxxxx	E M	x	x	xxxxxx	HH
Linkebeek	4,708	4,572	4,751	-2.89	3.92	-	xxx	E	xx	xx	xxxxxx	HH
Machelen	11,294	11,303	11,838	0.08	4.73	++	xxx	PM	xx	x	xxxxx	M
St. Genesius-Rode	16,830	17,861	17,998	6.13	0.77	-	xxxxx	E M	x	xx	xxxxxx	HH
St. Pieters-Leeuw	27,968	28,959	30,013	3.54	3.64	++	xxx	ME	xxx	xx	xxxxxx	M
Tervuren	18,942	19,488	20,181	2.88	3.56	+	xxxxxx	E	x	x	xxxxxx	HH
Vilvoorde	33,243	32,894	34,982	-1.05	6.35	+	xxxx	MP	xxx	xx	xxxxx	M
Wemmel	13,547	13,819	13,932	2.01	0.82	+	xxx	E M	x	xx	xxxxxx	HH
Wezembeek-Oppem	12,006	13,118	13,622	9.26	3.84	+	xxxxx	E	x	x	xxxxxx	HH
Zaventem	25,393	26,062	26,901	2.63	3.22	+	xxxx	E M	x	x	xxxxxx	HH
Walloon Region												
Braine-l'Alleud	30,028	32,458	35,259	8.09	8.63	+++	xxx	E M	x	xx	xxxxxx	HH
Waterloo	24,755	27,860	28,986	12.54	4.04	++	xxxxx	emp	x	xx	xxxxxx	HH
The rest of the urban region												
	341,031	**372,182**	**399,195**	**9.13**	**7.26**							
Flemish Region												
Asse	26,425	27,059	27,931	2.40	3.22	+	xx	E M	xxx	x	xxxxxx	HH
Bertem	7,788	8,439	8,843	8.36	4.79	++	xx	E	xxxx	x	xxxxxx	HH

Table 1. – continuation

	Population 1981	Population 1991	Population 2000	% growth 1981–91	% growth 1991–00	Net migration 1989–93	% foreigners 1991	Type foreigners 1991	% lack of conven. 1991	% unem-ployed 1991	income 1994	standard of living 1991
Gooik	7,735	8,164	8,834	5.55	8.21	++	x	*	xxxxx	x	xxxxx	H
Hoeilaart	8,914	9,540	9,783	7.02	2.55	+	xxxx	E	x	x	xxxxx	HH
Huldenberg	6,962	7,968	9,009	14.45	13.06	+++	xx	E	xxx	x	xxxxx	H
Kampenhout	8,905	9,919	10,723	11.39	8.11	+++	x	E M	xxxx	x	xxxxxx	H
Kortenberg	14,665	16,045	17,355	9.41	8.16	+++	xx	E	xx	x	xxxxxx	HH
Lennik	7,698	8,239	8,588	7.03	4.24	++	x	*	xxxxx	x	xxxxxx	H
Meise	15,170	17,062	18,347	12.47	7.53	+++	xx	E	x	x	xxxxxx	HH
Overijse	21,428	23,028	23,738	7.47	3.08	++	xxxxx	E	x	x	xxxxxx	HH
Pepingen	3,591	3,856	4,247	7.38	10.14	+++	x	*	xxxxxx	x	xxxxx	H
Steenokkerzeel	9,678	9,961	10,419	2.92	4.60	++	x	E M	xx	x	xxxxxx	HH
Ternat	12,294	13,450	14,418	9.40	7.20	++	x	E M	xxxx	x	xxxxxx	M
Zemst	17,167	18,992	20,553	10.63	8.22	+++	x	E M	xxxx	x	xxxxxx	HH
Walloon Region												
Beauvechain	5,167	5,767	6,199	11.61	7.49	+++	xxx	E M	xx	xx	xxxxxx	HH
Braine-le Château	7,403	8,087	8,994	9.24	11.22	+++	xxx	ME	xxxx	xx	xxxxxx	H
Chaumont-Gistoux	6,518	8,554	10,141	31.24	18.55	+++	xxx	E M	x	xx	xxxxxx	HH
Enghien	10,095	10,258	10,863	1.61	5.90	+++	xxx	ME	xxxxx	xxx	xxxxx	M
Grez-Doiceau	8,795	10,421	11,827	18.49	13.49	+++	xxx	E M	xx	xx	xxxxxx	HH
Ittre	4,826	5,115	5,561	5.99	8.72	+++	xxx	M	xxxxx	xxx	xxxxxx	M
La Hulpe	6,958	7,031	6,943	1.05	-1.25	--	xxxx	E M	x	xx	xxxxxx	HH
Lasne	10,919	12,729	13,512	16.58	6.15	+++	xxxx	E M	x	xx	xxxxxx	HH
Nivelles	21,580	23,217	23,751	7.59	2.30	+	xxx	ME	x	xxx	xxxxxx	M
Ottignies	19,609	22,816	27,380	16.35	20.00	+++	xxxxx	emp	x	xxx	xxxx	M
Rixensart	19,817	20,934	21,271	5.64	1.61	+	xxx	E M	x	xx	xxxxxx	HH
Silly	5,944	6,411	7,471	7.86	16.53	+++	xx	E M	xxxxx	xxx	xxxxx	H
Tubize	19,827	20,555	21,461	3.67	4.41	++	xxxxx	M	xxx	xxxx	xxxx	M
Wavre	25,153	28,565	31,033	13.56	8.64	+++	xxx	E P	x	xx	xxxxxx	HH

Source: Mérenne et al., 1997

Notes:

net migration (permillage):

+++	7.87 - 73.51	-	-1.18 - 0.00
++	3.46 - 7.86	--	-4.07 - -1.19
+	0.01 - 3.45	---	-66.5 - -4.08

percentage foreigners:

xxxxxx	19.19 - 57.93	xxx	30.3 - 9.03
xxxxx	13.57 - 19.18	xx	1.49 - 3.02
xxxx	9.04 - 13.56	x	0.13 - 1.48

type of foreigners:

E, M, P	> 60 % non-Mediterrenean European, Mediterrenean European, Maghreb and Turkish foreigners
EM, EP, MP, ME, PM, PE	> 60 % foreigners belonging to two groups, 30 % < first group < 60 %
emp	no dominant group
*	< 100 foreigners

percentages dwellings lacking basic conveniences:

xxxxxx	21.21 - 39.79	xxx	11.49 - 14.20
xxxxx	17.17 - 21.20	xx	8.41 - 11.48
xxxx	14.21 - 17.06	x	3.04 - 8.40

percentages unemployed (= unemployed and registered for employment):

xxxxxx	16.95 - 29.43	xxx	9.29 - 11.76
xxxxx	13.54 - 16.94	xx	6.69 - 9.28
xxxx	11.77 - 13.53	x	3.06 - 6.68

taxable income per inhabitant (x 1000 BEF)

xxxxxx	408.4 - 517.8	xxx	333.4 - 356.2
xxxxx	376.8 - 408.3	xx	304.9 - 333.3
xxxx	356.3 - 376.7	x	181.3 - 304.8

standard of living

HH	very high
H	high
M	moderate
LL	very low

the regions and communities: the Flemish Region coincides with the Dutch language region, the Walloon Region coincides with the French and German language regions, and the BCR coincides with the fourth language region, the bilingual region of Brussels Capital. The regions have powers relating to territorial matters: town and country planning, the environment, housing, agriculture, energy, employment, public works, transport, regional economic policy, and financing and control of the provinces and municipalities. Belgium also has three communities: the Flemish Community, the French Community and the German-speaking Community. The communities have powers in four categories: cultural issues, personal matters (health and social assistance), education, and the use of language in administrative matters, education and social relations between employers and employees. Each region and community has a parliament (the Council), and an executive (the Government); the councils and governments of the Flemish Region and of the Flemish Community have merged into a single Flemish Parliament and a single Flemish Government. They can issue decrees – or, in the case of the BCR, ordinances – that have the force of law. Because some of its general legal rules (those in the areas of town and country planning, public works and transport) are subject to legal controls by the central state, all general legal rules of the BCR are called ordinances rather than decrees.

Table 2. The fiscal capacity of the Regions

Fiscal year	Belgium Inctax/inh	BCR Inctax/inh	Flem. R. Inctax/inh	Wall. R. Inctax/inh
1990	64,770	72,886	66,851	58,654
1992	67,871	74,863	71,031	60,218
1994	77,221	82,211	81,523	68,171
1996	84,690	85,372	90,136	74,852
1998	92,939	91,125	99,254	82,241

Source: Boon et al., 1999, afl. 31: 46

The Flemish Community exercises power in the Flemish language region, the French Community in the French language region and the German-speaking Community in the German language region. The French Community may transfer certain powers to the Walloon Region, and the Walloon Region may transfer certain powers to the German-speaking Community. In addition, the Flemish Community covers the Flemish institutions established in the bilingual region of Brussels Capital and the French Community covers the French-speaking institutions established in that region. However, the decrees of the Flemish and French Communities do not have the force of law with regard to individuals in the bilingual region of Brussels Capital or to bilingual institutions. The corresponding community powers are exercised by other organizations, the Commission of the Flemish Community, the Commission of the French Community and the Commission of the Joint Communities, each of which has its own assembly and college. The Commission of the Joint Communities can pass ordinances, which have the force of law, but its power is restricted to personal matters. The Commissions of the French and the Flemish Communities, which can also act as organizers of unilingual institutions, can issue by-laws, which are lower in the hierarchy of legal rules than decrees or ordinances, and are comparable to the by-laws issued by provinces or municipalities. The French Community may transfer certain powers to the Commission of the French Community. As a consequence, the latter has the power to issue decrees on the matters concerned.

As the bilingual region of Brussels Capital does not belong to a province. Formerly the region of Brussels was part of the province of Brabant, one of nine provinces of Belgium. In 1995, the province of Brabant was divided into two provinces, Flemish Brabant and Walloon Brabant. The provincial powers in the 19 municipalities are exercised by the communities, the commissions and the region. Finally, as the successor of the Brussels Agglomeration, the BCR also discharges certain responsibilities elsewhere assigned to the municipalities, such



Figure 2. Connections between productive activities, state revenue and household income

Notes:
* income employers, professionals, self-employed
** merit goods and public goods (collective goods if produced/supplied by state enterprises, intercommunales or subsidized private/social organisations)
full lines: Section A
dotted lines: Section B
bold type: political entities, organizations, enterprises, agencies, networks
in italics: state revenue

The box 'exploitation, trade, conveyance, consumption' refers to a heterogeneous collection of items liable to a variety of direct and indirect taxes (the federal traffic tax, involving tax on the possession of a car, the transferred taxes on games and bets, and on automatic recreational apparatuses, customs duties, which are entirely transferred to the European Union, excises, the shared VAT, the transferred registration fees and death duties, the municipal tax on driving power, the municipal tax on employment, etc.)

as fire-fighting and emergency medical assistance, removal and processing of waste, passenger transport for payment, and coordination of municipal activities.

In summary, from the administrative viewpoint, the Brussels metropolitan area or urban region is composed of (i) municipalities that are part of the provinces of Flemish and Walloon Brabant and Hainaut, of the Flemish and the Walloon Regions and of the linguistic regions in which the Flemish and the French Communities exercise power, and (ii) 19 municipalities that make up the BCR, coinciding with the bilingual region of Brussels Capital. The BCR is a member state of the federal state of Belgium. The bilingual region of Brussels Capital is the linguistic region in which the Flemish and French Communities, and the Commissions of the Flemish, French and Joint Communities, exercise power. Thus, there are two administrative tiers in Brussels Capital, only one of which is on the level of local government (the tier of municipalities). It should be kept in mind that the Brussels metropolitan area (and even the Brussels morphological agglomeration) extends far beyond the boundaries of this two-tier entity. In Figure 2, the boxes for 'Region – Community – Commissions' and 'Municipality', and the absence of a box for 'Province' or 'Metropolitan Area' reflect the specific two-tier structure of Brussels Capital.

3. The sources of state revenue and household income

There are four sources of finance for the regions and for the French and Flemish Communities. These are: (i) shared taxes – regions and communities receive a portion of federal tax in proportion to the part of this tax levied on the territory of the region or community concerned; (ii) regional and community taxes; (iii) non-fiscal revenues (receipts from property and activities); and (iv) loans. In Brussels Capital, a fixed distributive code (80/20) is used for the division of the fiscal revenues of the French and Flemish Communities.

Shared taxes are the Value-Added Tax (VAT), which is shared by the federal government and the communities, and the income tax, which is shared by the federal government, the regions and the communities. The shared taxes are by far the most important source of revenue for the regions and communities. The share of income tax accounts for about 60% of the revenue of the BCR (which includes the federal solidarity contribution for the regions with a lower fiscal capacity than the national average). This percentage is low in comparison with the Walloon Region (70%), the French Community (90% including VAT) and the Flemish Community/Region (90% including VAT). These and other percentages are calculated on the most recent available data (1998, 1999 and/or 2000), unless otherwise stated. Regional taxes can be autonomous taxes, levied by a region in its own right, or transferred taxes, which are levied by the federal state and transferred to the regions. The latter include registration fees, death duties and a number of taxes of minor importance, such as land tax. The transferred taxes account for almost 20% of the revenue of the BCR, autonomous taxes account for only 5%, and 7% is derived from taxes that are levied by the BCR in its capacity as an agglomeration. Radio and television licence fees have become a community tax. This tax accounts for 4% of the revenue of the French Community and 3% of the revenue of the Flemish Community/Region. The revenues of the

German-speaking Community and of the Brussels Commissions consist mainly of endowments by the federal state (in the German-speaking Community: 80%, in the Commission of the Joint Communities: 60%), by the communities (Commission of the French Community: 50%), by the BCR (Commission of the French Community: 30%, Commission of the Joint Communities: 15%) and by the provinces. (Boon et al. 1990f).

The municipalities obtain revenue from five sources. These are: (i) municipal taxes and surtaxes; (ii) funds, including general grants (of which the Municipal Fund is by far the most important), and specific grants of the block type (The municipality of Brussels receives an additional endowment, registered in the budget of the federal Finance Department); (iii) subsidies (specific grants of the matching type); (iv) property and payments for municipal services; and (v) profit sharing in local state enterprises such as public utilities and *intercommunales*. Intercommunales are specific purpose agencies of two types, either pure (exclusively composed of participating municipalities) or mixed (composed of participating municipalities and private partners).

Taxes account for 45% of the revenue of the 19 municipalities of the BCR, funds for 18%, specific grants for 18% and profit sharing for 7%. About 20 years ago (in 1980), the grants from the Municipal Fund still exceeded the revenue from taxes, but by 1990, the share of the funds was reduced to 24% and the share of the taxes had risen to the present level. The increasing importance of taxes is a general trend occurring in the other two regions as well, but what sets the BCR apart is the share of revenue provided by surtaxes on real estate. These made up 26% of the total revenue of the 19 municipalities, compared to 11% from the additional tax on income and 7% from the municipal taxes. The corresponding values in the Walloon Region are 15%, 15% and 8%, and in the Flemish Region 19%, 18% and 8% respectively. The ratio of surtaxes on real estate in the BCR to surtaxes on real estate in the Walloon Region (in absolute amounts) is 2.4, while the same ratio for the Flemish Region is 2.0. (Claerhout 2000; Flohimont 1999; Van Hecke and Cardyn 1984).

Household incomes are derived from several sources. A household is an entity that pools incomes and shares resources over time so as to reproduce itself. Most households pool incomes of different types. Wallerstein and Smith (1992: 7–9) discern five major varieties: (i) wages, which are defined as the receipt of income from someone or some entity outside the household for work performed; (ii) profit, or market income, obtained by selling commodities or offering services on the market; (iii) rental income, derived from the remunerated use by someone outside the household of some entity to which one has legal property rights, yielding rent, interest, or dividends; (iv) transfers, which are receipts of income for which there is no immediate work-input counterpart, such as state transfers and private transfers or gifts from extended families, communities in the sense of super-extended families, and circles of friends; and (v) subsistence income, from direct labour input, such as self-production of food, self-manufacture of preserved food, clothing, housing, do-it-your- self products, and subsistence services.

Even leaving illegal incomes aside, Wallerstein's classification transcends the standard analysis of household income in the welfare state. The standard welfare state analysis distinguishes between primary or taxable income, secondary or freely disposable income and tertiary or redistributed income (Deleeck 1992: 23–26). Primary income, also designated as market income, consists of remunerations awarded in exchange for the supply of production factors, and corresponds to Wallerstein's first three categories (wages, profit and rental income). Wallerstein, by contrast, reserves the term 'market income' for profits. Secondary income is obtained by subtracting general transfers of income to the state (taxes and social security contributions) from the primary income, and adding the general transfers of income to the households (mainly social security benefits, but also tax expenditures and fringe benefits). The tertiary income is formed by subtracting transfers of income bound to the use of goods and services to the state (mainly VAT and excises) from the freely disposable income, and adding the specific transfers of income in money (for example, study grants and housing subsidies) or in kind (social goods, including services) to the households. There are two kinds of social goods: public goods (for example, national defence and justice), which cannot be appropriated individually, because no one can be excluded from the benefits of these goods and the use of them by any individual cannot be at the expense of their use by another individual; and merit goods (for example, education and health care), which are thought to be essential to the functioning of society as a whole, but which can be appropriated individually. Merit goods can be produced or offered by private enterprises or by the state. In the latter case, we call them collective goods. Public goods can rarely be produced or offered by the private sector and are almost by definition collective goods. In many cases, merit goods are offered at below cost price by private social organizations that are heavily subsidized by the state. In this case, they are also referred to as collective goods. The general and specific transfers to the households that are added to the primary income correspond to Wallerstein's subcategory of state transfers, provided that this subcategory is enlarged to include all kinds of social goods. Private transfers and subsistence income (used in Wallerstein's sense) fall outside the framework of the welfare state and, as a consequence, are beyond the range of the standard analysis. Nevertheless, they contribute to the household income and are therefore represented in Figure 2, in isolated boxes.

In Belgium, collective goods are provided at all government levels by central, federated and local governments. The system of social services is regulated by the public authorities, but professional social organizations, trade unions, medical insurance associations, employers' federations, farmers' associations and associations of small business operators participate in policy-making, management and execution by means of a network of deliberative, advisory and governing bodies and conceded administrative executive services and local initiatives. The state creates the legal framework, but social organizations formulate and implement initiatives to a large degree. This model typifies education (community, provincial, municipal and private education), social housing (local social housing companies), health care (medical insurance associations, public and Catholic hospitals), welfare (public centres and non-profit associations) and especially social security. This reflects the development of the Belgian welfare state from 19th-century local initiatives, mainly workers' organizations. (Deleeck 1992: 189–190). Social security is one of the responsibilities of the federal state. At present, the federal state has residual powers and, as it is not on the list of powers explicitly assigned to the regions or communities, social security is one of them.

The municipal Public Centres for Social Welfare (PCSW) are responsible for relief. The expenditure per inhabitant of the 19 municipalities of the BCR is much higher than in the other regions (Table 3). This is largely due to the expenditure of the municipality of

Brussels (amounting to 140,000 BEF per inhabitant), which also impacts on the budget structure (the small share of the section Sanitation – Urbanization is explained by the fact that this function has been taken over by semi-governmental companies on the regional level). The expenditure of the other municipalities does not deviate significantly from that of strongly urbanized municipalities of the same population size in the other regions, with the exception of four municipalities, St Josse-ten-Noode, Etterbeek, St Gilles and Ixelles, which heavily subsidize their PCSW. (Flohimont 1999).

Table 3. Expenditure (Bef/inh.) of the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels municipalities (2000)

Expenditure for	Flemish Region	Walloon Region	BCR
General government	6246	7715	12572
Safety	5468	5666	10222
Roads	5494	5376	2270
Economy	857	1233	397
Education	5341	8907	15445
Culture – Worship	6093	3630	3962
Welfare – Health	5226	5008	10009
Sanitation-Urbanization	4849	5434	3871
Not assignable	1451	2388	4156
Total	41025	43357	62904

Source: Claerhout, 2000: 28.

4. Spheres of economic integration

The four municipalities mentioned above contain a number of deprived neighbourhoods. Actually, these neighbourhoods are statistical units. Statistical neighbourhoods are the smallest territorial units for which census data are gathered. In 1991 (the most recent census), 434 of the 7,189 neighbourhoods with 200 inhabitants or more in the Flemish and Brussels Capital Regions were deprived neighbourhoods (neighbourhoods scoring high values on at least four of seven indicators of deprivation determined by means of factor analysis: percentages of singles, of workers, of dwellings lacking basic conveniences, of Turks and Moroccans, of low incomes, of persons registered for employment, and of households lacking a telephone). Of these 434 neighbourhoods, 178 were located in the BCR. (Kesteloot 1996b)

However, deprived neighbourhoods are found in the other low-income/low--living-standard municipalities of the BCR as well. The highest degrees of deprivation are found in the adjacent parts of Molenbeek-St. Jean, Anderlecht, Forest and Brussels, and of St Josse-ten-Noode and Schaarbeek. In 1991, no less than 39% of the households and 36% of the inhabitants of the BCR were living in deprived neighbourhoods. In these neighbourhoods, the environment and housing conditions cause further deprivation and perpetuate poverty because of the lack of high-quality social services and the concentration of poor people, many of whom are frequently driven to rely on their own inadequate resources in trying to escape hardship. (Kesteloot 1996b). Building on this research and subsequent research on urban social exclusion, Kesteloot (Kesteloot 1996a; Kesteloot and Meert 2000) has developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of social exclusion and integration based on Polanyi's three modes of transaction: reciprocity, redistribution and market exchange. These modes of economic integration were introduced in geographical literature 30 years ago by Harvey (1973: 206–215, 240–284), who, following Fried, combined them with the basic types of society (egalitarian, rank and stratified). Harvey used these modes to explain the existence of cities in rank and stratified societies, and the simultaneous presence of the three modes and the accompanying societal structures in capitalist societies (taking into account the preponderance of market exchange) to explain the general architectural and urban features of the urban landscape. Kesteloot concentrates on the spatial dimensions of what he calls the spheres of economic integration.

People enter into different types of relations to gain access to means of existence that they do not produce themselves. These different types of relations are: market exchange, redistribution and reciprocity. Market exchange, which is the dominant type in our society because of the advanced division of labour, means that individuals or households are capable of developing a social utility – that is, they can sell some goods (labour, products or services) that are needed by other individuals or households on the market. Market exchange is characterized by the autonomy of the parties. They themselves make the choice of what they offer for sale. Social utility is determined afterwards by the law of demand and supply. Redistribution means that individuals or households contribute to a common stock of resources to be redistributed according to a set of rules. In the welfare state, redistribution is aimed at reducing the inequalities inherent in the working of market exchange. Redistribution requires a central point of collection and a hierarchical organization. Reciprocity refers to mutual exchange within a network of kin, friends or companions. The contribution of a participant in the form of products and services to the network will be more-or-less compensated for by the contribution of another participant at a later time, usually in the form of other products and services. Reciprocity implies that each of the participants has the capacity to produce some goods and has access to a social network, governed by a set of social obligations. As a rule, there are symmetric links between each member and the rest of the network, although there exist reciprocity systems in which the flow of products and services goes chiefly in one direction, from those who have to those who do not have. Households are economically integrated into society when they manage to obtain sufficient means of existence through one or more of these transactional systems, which explains the term 'sphere of economic integration'. Social exclusion means that access to one or more of these spheres is obstructed.

Kesteloot's theoretical framework has some conceptual difficulties related to the basis from which it is derived. Originally, redistribution referred to the obligatory payments rendered to central political or religious authorities, which used the receipts for their own maintenance, to provide community services and for emergencies. In rank societies, redistribution involves a flow of goods (or in some cases the establishment of rights over production) to support the activities of an elite. A remnant of this kind of redistribution to the rich is the inverse care law or Mattheüs-effect. The middle classes appear to benefit much more from the transfers of income relating to social goods than the actual target groups (Deleeck 1992). This might be an unintended result of redistributive policy, but it may not be undesirable to the policy makers from the viewpoint of social stability. In applying the concept to modern societies as Kesteloot does, the question arises whether the income of civil servants or other producers and suppliers of collective goods belongs to the sphere of redistribution or to the sphere of market exchange. One may be tempted to identify market exchange with primary income, but the result is an analysis of household income in which there seems to be no room for reciprocity. Reciprocity corresponds to Wallerstein's subcategory of private transfers. However, there are forms of private transfer that belong to the sphere of redistribution – for example secular and religious charities. These also fall outside the range of the standard analysis of income in the welfare state.

Nevertheless, leaving these conceptual difficulties aside, Kesteloot's theoretical framework is a fruitful one because it makes possible a finely tuned analysis of the spatial settings in which households find themselves. Each sphere of integration (i) has its own spatial logic, (ii) requires a specific set of social and material infrastructures with their own locational regularities, and (iii) relates in a specific way to the socio-spatial structures of the past with embedded symbols, habits and relations that can be reactivated.

Regarding the first point, market exchange is determined by the spatial range of the goods and services offered. This is well documented by classical location theories in which centrality and access (distance and transportation costs) are the key concepts. Redistribution is spatially organized within a delimited territory in which resources are both collected and redistributed. The governmental situation of the metropolitan area will determine the possibilities of redistribution at different geographical scales. The same location theories, in combination with the institutional approach, can be used to describe access to the collective resources and to reveal inequalities in their location and access, which derive from the decisions of the public authorities. In the sphere of reciprocity, spatial proximity is an asset in the sense that it facilitates the relation between exchange and maintenance of the network involved, thus generating the necessary trust. However, trust is more likely to appear within strong kinship and community relations, and in these cases, the network can function on a larger spatial range. Regarding the second point, market exchange presupposes a population concentration that exceeds the level necessary for efficient production and distribution. This benefits the central city, but de-industrialization, polarization of the labour market and a growing employment mismatch between the urban centre and the periphery gradually hamper access to jobs from the same area. Redistribution entails the actual presence of the means of collective consumption and of the agents for this distribution. Reciprocity needs an appropriate mix of private, semi-public and public spaces in which social relations can develop, and through which networks can be maintained and used simultaneously. Reciprocal exchange will gain in efficiency if the resources held by the participants are sufficiently differentiated. Consequently, it has more potential in a socially heterogeneous area than in areas where all the people have similar demands and resources. Finally, regarding the third point, spatial settings carry a history, which may reinforce certain systems of transaction – for example, traditions of trade and innovation, a history of workers' participation in the struggle to build the welfare state, or a tradition of hospitality and mutual help. A complex set of elements and conditions will determine whether or not this memory of space will actually play a role in the processes of economic integration. Moreover, historical elements can also play a negative role – for example, a reputation for deprivation or for being unsafe (Kesteloot and Meert 2000).

In most discussions on the economic base, the metropolitan area is implicitly or explicitly conceived as a group of territorial communities – that is, areas and their populations ruled by a (possibly two- or three-tiered) set of local governments, exceptionally (as in the case of Brussels) supplemented by a federal government, whose role is to promote urban transactional systems in order to strengthen the competitiveness of the metropolitan economy. The research of Kesteloot and his associates on transactional systems, in the sense of spheres of economic integration located in urban regions, makes us aware of an equally valuable alternative concept of the metropolitan area-namely, that it is a territorialized habitat of households in different spatial settings. The role of the governments involved in the territorialization is to promote these kinds of transactional systems in order to prevent social exclusion and deprivation. As one of these transactional systems is market exchange, part of this role is integral to the allocative function of the financial policy of the state, although the emphasis on competitiveness should be balanced by attention to ethnic and other local small-scale entrepreneurship. This alternative view of transactional systems also turns the strengthening of social networks and the social mix into an economic issue (beyond creating a favourable climate for investment). Above all, Kesteloot's view re-emphasizes the importance of redistribution. As Kesteloot and Meert (2000) say, both market exchange and reciprocity are two blind regulation mechanisms revolving around a situation of exchange balance, but without any decision-making process to enable people to control the nature of the equilibrium situation and its progress over time. Redistribution is the only mode of economic integration through which access to basic resources can be guaranteed for everybody without exception, because it has a central decision-making process that, so far as state redistribution is concerned, lies in the realm of politics, and decisions can result from democratic processes.

5. Regimes

In Brussels, state redistribution on the local level occurs under very limited conditions. The origins of the limitations are well known: municipal autonomy and the process of suburbanization (in essence a process of selective migration) leading to segregation of higher and lower income groups. These are universal conditions, but in the case of Brussels, the limitations are exacerbated by the absence of any amalgamation of municipalities within the BCR and by the fact that the richest suburbs are located outside the BCR. In addition, one of the most important potential objects of redistribution, social housing, constitutes only a very small segment of the housing market in Brussels (as in Belgium as a whole).

The fragmentation of Brussels and the privatized structure of its housing provision contrast with the consolidation of Amsterdam and the more collective structure of its housing provision. These are the key issues in the comparative study of the two cities by Terhorst and van de Ven (1997, 1999). Both cities are capital cities of capitalist welfare states, but they show striking differences in urban landscape. These differences are due to, among other things, the Brussels policy of Haussmannization in the late 19th century, and the freedom of action for developers, building contractors and real estate agents employed in Brussels in the late 20th century. Terhorst and van de Ven explain these factors by referring to property rights, which determine the private or collective character of goods. According to Terhorst and van de Ven, private (collective) goods are private (collective) on the basis of property rights and not purely on the basis of technical characteristics. The principles of non-rivalry and of non-exclusivity, invoked to define public goods (see the second paragraph). The smaller (greater) the number of individuals that have access to a certain good, the more private (collective) the good; the smaller (greater) the number of conditions to use the good, the more private (collective) the good. These property rights are necessarily linked ("necessarily" in the sense of critical or transcendental realism) to three rules, which make up the basic structure of the state. These three rules are (i) electoral rules (which concern who is entitled to participate in the decision-making process, and according to which decisions are taken); (ii) fiscal rules (which determine who contributes in which way to the collective); and (iii) territorial rules (which divide the politico-administrative functions of the state into territorial units). Property rights, electoral rules and fiscal rules can be manipulated by means of territorial strategies, which are „strategies to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographical area" (Sack 1986: 19). The three rules are strongly interrelated, and a change in any one of them induces changes in the other two, which implies a fundamental shift of power in society. Terhorst and van de Ven call a historically and geographically specific set of these interdependent rules a 'regime', and interpret the development of the urban landscape in Amsterdam and Brussels in terms of a succession of regimes. Table 4 summarizes the interpretation of Brussels, which is examined in more depth below.

According to Terhorst and van de Ven, the period 1831–1960 was characterized by rivalry between the Liberals, who dominated the towns, and the Catholics, who dominated the countryside. Both groups had a common interest in excluding the lower classes from the right to vote, which was restricted to those who paid a minimum of national direct taxes. As an expansion of the taxes was not in the interest of the enfranchised affluent strata of the population, increasing collective expenditure had to be paid for by higher national or local excises, mainly on bread and beer. The opposite interests of Liberals and Catholics manifested themselves in the higher taxes required to obtain the right to vote in towns, and in the incorporation of large parts of the countryside into urban constituencies to counter the power of the Liberals in the towns. The city of Brussels started to experience negative external effects as a result of its high population density. Expenditure on social goods rose. As this required an increase in excises, it incited people to suburbanize. The threatening stalemate between the Liberals and the Catholics could only be avoided by a change of regime, because other solutions were blocked. The national state was not prepared to raise endowments to Brussels because the Catholics did not see any reason to solve the problems of the towns. Renovation to attract more affluent people into the town was not desirable as this would have stopped the transfer of the expenses for social goods to the poor. Nor was large-scale annexation possible, because the authorization of the central state to incorporate territory of other municipalities was dependent on the abolition of local excises without compensation. The foundation of the Municipal Fund, compensating for the abolition of excises in 1860, marked the beginning of a new regime. From then on, the revenue of the municipalities was derived from surtaxes on national taxes, and general grants from the Municipal Fund, the size of which depended on the amount of direct taxes

Table 4. The sequence of regimes in Belgium/Brussels (after Terhorst and van de Ven, 1997)

Electoral system	**Fiscal system**	**Territorial structure**	**Main feature**	**Political power relations**
1830–1860: urban growth and political fragmentation of space				
oligarchic spatially differentiated direct taxes	Strongly decentralized indirect taxes	fragmented	Stalemate	liberals vs. Catholics
1860–1914: Haussmannization and the confinement of the working class at the countryside				
from oligarchic restricted democratic	decentralized **direct taxes**	Fragmented	Haussmannization (Urbanism)	liberals vs. Catholics rise of socialists
1919–1962: urban sprawl and frozen municipal boundaries				
democratic	decentralized moderately progressive income tax	fragmented	lock-in	classes-pillars-language groups
1963 – : Brussels in custody				
democratic	decentralized progressive income tax	**consolidated exc. Brussels**	radical growth (spatial planning)	federalization

Notes:
bold type - decisive change of rule

collected. Consequently, municipalities were encouraged to augment their tax bases. They could achieve this by bringing rich people within their boundaries. In Brussels, since large-scale annexation was blocked for a variety of reasons, urbanization in the form of slum clearance would achieve this goal, which explains the period of Haussmannization.

The most recent regime identified by Terhorst and van de Ven had its origins in the freezing of the boundaries between the linguistic regions in 1963. This paved the way for the large-scale amalgamation of municipalities in 1976, when the former 2,379 municipalities were consolidated into the present 589 municipalities. However, consolidation failed to occur in the Brussels language region. The setting up of the Agglomeration and afterwards the Region, together with the stubbornness of the local politicians, accounts for the continuation of the fragmented territorial structure of Brussels. The fragmentation of the Region and its constitutional limitation to the 19 municipalities creates the possibility for high-income population strata to pass on the costs of social goods to low-income population strata. This means that poor people pay twice: once directly, because the fiscal system restricts the levy of income taxes to inhabitants, and a second time through social displacement and bad housing conditions, due to a combination of rising real estate prices and processes of deprivation, which are reinforced by the structure of the housing market. The fiscal system encourages increases to the tax base, and the territorial structure excludes suburbanized high-income strata from being taxed by the central city. Both factors stimulate gentrification, renovation and development, facilitated by the privatized structure of housing provision, which is a legacy of former regimes. This explains the freedom of action for developers, building contractors and real estate agents.

The transfer by the rich of the costs of social goods to the poor by means of territorial strategies is a well-known phenomenon, but Terhorst and van de Ven were keen to show how territorial strategies operate within the framework of historically and geographically specific sets of interrelated rules about tax raising, political decision-making and territorial division. The capital and high-income strata benefit from fiscal decentralization and territorial fragmentation. However, one of the problems of a fiscally decentralized and territorially fragmented state is the realization of scale economies. This problem can be solved by creating specific-purpose agencies, in which several municipalities are represented in a more-or-less equal way. One should realize that this implies a change in the electoral rules: a deviation from the principle of one person/one vote. On the other hand, fiscal centralization and territorial consolidation may lead to the fiscal and electoral inclusion of capital and high-income strata, but whether or not low-income strata benefit from this depends on their power to enforce redistribution to their advantage. In this case, too, the principle of one person/one vote is violated, namely by neo-corporatist processes of decision-making, in which labour and especially capital are favoured. In fragmented Brussels, which is part of a welfare state with strong neo-corporatist traits, redistribution, though its necessity is advocated by Kesteloot, is not easily achieved, the more so since a large number of inhabitants of deprived neighbourhoods are electorally excluded – inhabitants of non-EU foreign nationality have no right to vote.

6. Conclusion

High-income population strata try to shift the costs of supplying collective goods to low income population strata by means of, among other things, territorial strategies of fragmentation. These strategies are applied within the framework of a regime, a historically and geographically specific set of interrelated rules regulating the fiscal, electoral and territorial systems. Effective resistance against these territorial strategies therefore implies a change not only in political power relations but also in the basic structure of the state itself. This poses a huge problem in the area of redistribution, but its necessity can be judged by the fact that it is the most appropriate sphere of economic integration for the state to promote if it wants to prevent social exclusion and deprivation. However, the state should also promote the other transactional systems of reciprocity and market exchange. This leads to the concept of the metropolitan area as the territorialized habitat of households in spatial settings, which, in relation to Figure 2, entails emphasis on section B instead of on section A, which is associated with the usual concept of the metropolitan area as an ensemble of territorial communities, ruled by a two- or three-tiered set of local (or federal) governments. The alternative concept has its origins in the substantive definition of the economy – namely, that all societies need to organize material life to ensure the sustained provision of food, shelter and the items necessary for the maintenance of community life (as opposed to the standard definition of the allocation of scarce means to alternative ends). The economic base simply cannot be reduced to tax-generating activities.

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TRANSAKČNÍ SYSTÉMY, TERITORIALITA A PŘÍKLAD BRUSELU: REFLEKCE NA POJEM EKONOMICKÁ ZÁKLADNA METROPOLITNÍCH OBLASTÍ

Résumé

Příspěvek se věnuje dvěma geografickým aspektům interakce mezi alokativní a redistributivní funkcí federálních a lokálních vlád. Za prvé se zabývá otázkou jak příjmové aktivity domácností závisí na prostorových podmínkách. Za druhé se příspěvek věnuje otázce týkající se manipulace teritoriality vyššími příjmovými skupinami, které se snaží vyhnout nákladům na poskytování kolektivních služeb skupinám s nižším příjmy. Teoretické koncepty „sféry ekonomické integrace“ a „režimy“ umožňují prozkoumat základní pojmy konceptu ekonomické základny metropolitního areálu. Závěry příspěvku ukazují, že koncepce ekonomické základny nemůže být redukována pouze na aktivity, které generují daně. Metropolitní areál by měl být koncipován jako habitat domácností v prostorových uspořádáních a ne jako seskupení prostorových komunit, které jsou ovládány lokální nebo federální samosprávou v systémech se dvěma a nebo třemi úrovněmi.